

WS CITY DEAL & BADGERYS AIRPORT AS SYDNEY'S SAVIOURS: STRETCHING OUR "PLANNING STENCH"

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The progressive erosion of effective democratic institutions in planning by state governments is likely to increase the political potency of planning as an election issue at a state government level.

Dr Rob Stokes, former NSW Minister for Planning

City Deals are internationally-famous as devices to devolve silo funding from central agencies to city governments. The NSW Government and the Federal Governments are fused in their broad approach to Sydney and in particular a "WESTERN SYDNEY CITY DEAL", which led in October '16 ...

Mr Turnbull (to) spruik the deal as a "very big change" in the federal government's relationship with the NSW government when it came to the investment in cities.

To that date there was a division of responsibilities between levels of government. The Deal was a platform for fusion, genuine or false. A relatively small amount of capital was on offer, \$50 million for planning. Existing State metro and tram projects are early indicators of the success or failure of the CITY DEAL approach to achieve what an acknowledged planning expert, Dr Garry Bowditch, concluded:

Community support and trust towards credible infrastructure plans must be earned with sound community engagement and better customer service outcomes. These must form the central plank of the new long-term infrastructure-planning regime, not just a focus on assets and projects. This is by far Australia's most pressing infrastructure imperative.

If such imposed projects continue, no number of City Deals can be done with genuine community engagement.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Western Sydney is a major component of the national economy, with significant political clout, and has long been disappointed with successive governmental promises. It experiences the same effects as the rest of Sydney in relation to the lack of a "City Plan", project dislocation, and financial disparities in spatial and intergenerational terms
2. Project dislocation (cost >\$30 billion since 2012) comes from failure to implement accepted probity and prudential guidelines, the State Government's troubles with low engineering and economic standards in all of its projects, and lack of a Budget model for assessing financial and project needs against alternative options' operational, economic, financial, congestion, housing affordability and associated outcomes
3. The Office of the Prime Minister emulated the UK model of "city deals" in conjunction with Smart Cities' "30-Minute Cities" but without reference to the UK purpose, which is to reinvigorate local democracy by taking central agency "silo" funds and giving them to metropolitan governments. PMO's City Deal preparations excluded local government according to Dr Stephen Kennedy in the media
4. The Greater Sydney Commission gives semi-statutory effect to City Plans and it is vital that proper integration happens rather than a continuation of mishaps which are increasing congestion and housing costs
5. **The City Deal as delivered, with iA's "Future Cities – Planning for Population Growth", fails to incorporate accepted protections of the public interest and intergenerational equity. It particular it repeats failures to observe needs analysis and feasibility guidelines, continues dysfunctional project approaches, and denies the Prime Minister's promises. The implications extend past the WS region to all of Greater Sydney's networked transport and logistics systems. It is suggested it be withdrawn and re-done.**

MAIN FACTORS:

City Deal: wrong model? UK Localism has a different purpose to Smart Cities; while project planning directions divorce communities from influence and fairness in taxation, with both the Premier and

GSC cannot lead metropolitan planning, orderly development, metropolitan planning, promote the supply of housing (including affordable) and integrate government infrastructure decision-making with land use planning, infrastructure and land use decisions, under its Act and abilities
Governmental processes are conflicted and need cleansing, while the probity protocols

NSW Productivity Commission defers housing supply reform when "now, knucklehead" is needed

Too many mishaps remain unresolved including closure of 40% of the Bradfield system, non-inclusion of Christie and Greiner, and damage to

Chief Commissioner determined to push through protests.

underpinning iA's 2008 and iNSW's 2012 guidelines have not been met

Central Coast and other commuting and specials events performance.

WS CITY PLAN FEATURES:

An inspired leak, with map, was printed in the SMH on 23 February. (An indication was given by iA as explained later.) The features there are compared here with the details announced on 4 March:

SMH

- SW to 2nd Airport Rail Link (Fletcher on record as West Metro is best) - \$1-3 billion
- Airport to St Marys - \$30 billion
- Planners say SW extension won't be ready for 2026 + value capture
- Fletcher says "city shaping" dictates SW not Parra connection
- Labor SW to Badgers then Rouse Hill
- NSW PR said SW included in this

PM PR

- NS rail from St Mary's to 2nd Airport [NB no SW], 50:50 Fed/State – words differ from map (below)
- \$100 m for Business Case* on that option (also 50:50)
- Investment Attraction Office
- New planning regime via councils
- \$150 m to community facilities
- Skills training
- 4G – what happened to NBN?

The change from SW to NW access is dramatic, is tied in with the inherent poor economics of the NW, and is clearly contrary to the stated intentions of the Federal Minister for Cities and Infrastructure. It will be interesting to explore the influences at work which presumably are from the State not local government.

The potential for the usual cost imprecisions and overruns and the usual redactions in "summary business cases" is considerable in the absence of preparatory stages (below and cf Grattan's various reports) and discipline on iA and iNSW *et al.* The CEO of WSROC had said that the full north-south "is not about growth forecasting, or business cases, or demand modelling, or feasibility studies. It is all about vision and just a little bit about courage".

The PM said that the City Deal was fully agreed with councils in the SW and West being not Parramatta or Blacktown but Camden, Campbelltown, Liverpool, Penrith, Wollondilly, the Blue Mountains, Hawkesbury and Fairfield.

It is now normal for Federal and State Governments to ignore probity and prudential protocols even though both have experienced great pain in other places. Why they won't learn is a tragedy for the Australian people.


Those iA protocols include **needs analyses and feasibility tests of options** in advance of **businesses cases (plural)**.

GSC has not resolved the issue of Bankstown Airport which will be important for regional passengers.

Neither Governments' advisors are sufficiently aware of Sydney's circumstances to realise that the options include:

1. Christie 2001, freight line from Enfield to Werrington
2. Christie and Greiner upgrading of Main West to 40,000 passengers per hour per direction - faster, cheaper and more effective than West Metro (which in turn is preferred by Fletcher)
3. RG suggestion to extend Main West to Badgers to give the best transit of any world airport
4. RG reservation of SW extension for 110 container trains per day from Pt Kembla to major IMT at/near Badgers thence to/from Parkes on Inland Rail (Melbourne/Brisbane).

iA's Australian Infrastructure Plans (2016 and 2017) found that



instances of poor project selection and weak governance continue to occur. Recent history shows governments committing to investments before completing long-term planning or rigorous economic analysis; favouring large 'iconic' projects over smaller, often higher value, investments; and not releasing the full business case for multi-billion dollar projects.

In addition, a lack of transparency and genuine community engagement has undercut public confidence in governments' ability to make the best investment decisions. This makes it harder to build community support for future investments and complex reforms that will be required to meet Australia's infrastructure needs.

In line with iA's comments and mine, it is suggested the above thinking is unlikely to give the community confidence that wise and productive decisions are being taken.

IA PRECURSOR

Future Cities reads as a fairy tale:

While Australian governments are increasingly using scenario tools, it has yet to become an established practice when planning for our cities, and there has been only a limited sample of this work made publicly available.... In reality, a complex interplay of policy decisions and unforeseen factors will shape the long-term development of Australia's cities.

The scenario analysis shows that well-planned cities... will deliver the best outcomes for Australian communities. ... if our largest cities are going to successfully respond to growth, changes to their structure and operation, and the processes used to deliver these, will be needed.

Instead, possibly, the first use in Sydney was the RTA's Future Directions about 25 years ago (SATS preceded it). iA is now too late as fundamental project and policy "decisions" have been made on capricious and even destructive grounds – lobby- and corporate-driven – and dug-in by obsessive stakeholders.

The same naiveté is demonstrated in iA's "(our) process is the first time long-term infrastructure and land-use planning have been developed in concert for Sydney." This is as stupid (PM's word) as the Committee for Sydney's erroneous assertion it had inspired the "emergence of the first metropolitan coordination structure Sydney has seen in the form of the Greater Sydney Commission". And GSC's own, of the Badgerys airport, that for the "first time in over 100 years, this major catalyst will provide the opportunity to change the shape and structure of an extensive area of Greater Sydney".

Scenario testing with proper needs analysis would have changed these three contexts and all others, illustrative of the lost opportunities in the City Deal:

Bankstown/ Green Square Metro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Airport Link has two stations but Metro will put in one more and iA sees additional tram as essential but pointing to CBD instead of reducing congestion between Newtown and say Bondi Junction. The Bankstown extension was decided by the project team (TfNSW advice) which is weird, undemocratic and inept – they didn't realise they'd "have" to "straighten" platforms, massively increasing costs – but all unnecessarily according to German expert 	<p>No known needs analysis of E/W demand (cross-regional), focus is on CBD axis which may be "stupid". iA was appealing Berejiklian and especially LM Moore w/o logic or analysis of options. PM has special liking for trams.</p> <p>Metro: "public" benefit/cost ratio appears to be about 0. Commercially very risky, tax basis would be inequitable and inefficient. Greiner and Christie proposed rapid transit on upgraded Bradfield lines, with capacity of 40,000 passengers per hour in each direction, RG suggests extension to Badgerys[®]. The West Metro is a "white elephant" and its cost burden prejudices more logical options.</p>
West Metro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Labor idea, one of many on the merry-go-round, a "lot of money" has been spent out-of-sequence (attacked by Grattan as pushing up costs) – but it reduces investor and community confidence. David Borger's "there's no downside" was typical cant. Goanna Transit Bridge out of RG's work Vs Labor is cost-effective and very useful, that it is neglected is a sign of psychological defects as well's as UGNSW's hubris in stopping all development. 	<p>Might be valid but there are many internal options and no testing of the main Christie/Greiner one which has major advantages. Berejiklian rejects all of RG's work <i>ex cathedra</i> and thereby lost Google and 16,000 housing units</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Goanna has a different function in space, "local solution" councils also tricked into naming rights over a long-term and improbably Metro monstrosity instead of understanding the basics Berejiklian's rejection of Google (Turnbull/Baird "most exciting urban redevelopment in the world") replaced by RG's The Fireworks – a potential wonderful Joint Venture for NSW
Barangaroo ExpressNet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linking of the street transit systems (bus and tram) on the eastern and western 	<p>Provision of</p>

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sides of the CBD via street systems and the construction of a curved Goanna Transit Bridge[®] from above Barangaroo to Rozelle off the tips of headlands (minimising land disruption). Its “mother” bridge was built 10 years ago at Coalcliff, costing just \$60 million. Extending for length, the Goanna would cost about \$500 million – cheap for its great value

- Resolution of CBD congestion by the elimination of 7 E/W conflicted intersections through a circumferential road and transit boulevard – where the Jan Gehl and George St tram schemes worsened the realities

- fast transit through The Bays to the Victoria Road corridor at Rozelle, including the Overseas Passenger Terminal and White Bay Power Station (the Google site, now foregone due to delays in providing transit enablement)
- Relief of the ANZAC Bridge (and speeding-up buses) which is about to experience 20% more congestion off the WestConnex works
- Walking and cycling in extension of current programs, and
- The basis of a long-term fast Flexity Swifta or similar tram/trains system (“expressnet”) to link street and rail transit systems. (This is urban innovation but of a type well-known in Europe, checked by a former Bombardier senior engineer.) One stream could run to Victoria Road and thence North Ryde; the other via Norton Street and back to Central via three universities and two regional shopping/services centres.

Here are some comments on what iA says it has based its technically-limited scenario-testing on.

It needs to be remembered that Berejiklian’s promises are heading towards \$100 billion unfunded with rumours coming out of TfNSW of even bigger catastrophes ahead (such as tunnelling under Razorback’s shale). The SMH’s informed leak on the WS City Deal mentions \$30 billion for the new north-south line (outer orbital), of which the sponsoring CEO of WSROC decried iA protocols (reflecting Carl Scully’s contempt for due process and exploiting Liberal influence circles), and it bears no relationship to “30-Minute City”. In terms of priority, it is probably classic “ideology and stupidity” as is WSROC’s position.

iA has accepted, without due and proper consideration, the following Bairdijikian specials in Low Density even though not relevant to it

ROAD	Comments - NB remember Grattan Roads to Riches
Beaches Link	unlegitimised bias, ignores 2008 and DOTARS
Bringelly Rd Stg 2	inevitable
M5 West upgrade	inevitable
NorthConnex	inevitable
Northern Rd Upgrade	inevitable
Outer Sydney Orbital	explain, if M10 then politically-led
Sth Connector M'way (F6?)	ignores defects
WestConnex all stages	ignores out of capacity & Goanna option
Western Harbour Tunnel	unlegitimised bias
Western Syd Infra Plan	explain
Parra Rd BRT	same wrong model as dumped by Berejiklian?
RAIL	Comments - NB remember Grattan Roads to Riches
Bankstown-L'pool High Capacity Upgrade	East Hills is higher priority
Metro NW City SW	Lack merit and legitimacy
West Metro	Inferior to Goanna + iNSW/Christie upgrading of Main West
Badgerys-Campbelltown	Not properly considered against logistics ex Maldon-Dombarton
Badgerys-Leppington	How justified? See also above
Badgerys-St Marys	How justified? See also above
Hurstville-Olympic Park (not in Low Density)	Misses most important adaptive innovation opportunity*
Parramatta tram Stage 2	Not in Low Density but misses point of ParraCity's earlier work * cf Eddington Bedrock

Roads to Riches proposed that (after political authorisation) politicians be divorced from project development until results are tabled in Parliament.

NSW’s poor record and the current lack of Federal counterbalancing leads to support for Grattan around a wider set of options.

Savings to be gained from proper procedures are very significant – a minimum of \$30 billion since Greiner was forced out in 2012 including the 2nd Harbour Crossing which was out of priority order and unnecessary had the Hurstville-to-Strathfield line been included as urged in BEDROCK. (That that orbital now has nominally snuck in the back door is shameful but typical of an intellectually bereft Government.) The Crossing only gained primary political ranking because of Berejiklian’s 2012 NW Tunnel blunder (and Government and media lack of awareness).

iA admitted that “The implications of poor practice are substantial. Research completed by the University of Melbourne’s Next Generation Engagement Project has found that around \$20 billion in infrastructure projects have been delayed, cancelled or mothballed due to community opposition over the past decade”. That is superficial and Grattan have put a higher cost on the effects of poor engineering and managerial practices including the lack of pre-planning (cf WestConnex, ES tram, Bankstown and all metros, and Parra tramways).

It was observed that:

1. iA is sufficiently up-to-date to include unannounced City Deal contents (it has twice written to this analyst saying “iA is not involved in planning Western Sydney”) but has left in the Parramatta Road BRT that was technically deficient and dumped by Berejiklian in her obsessive pursuit of the West Metro
2. iA has included options that are sub-standard and excluded better options – neither independent nor professional

3. iA excluded logistics on the grounds of practical measurement but that is incorrect and denies the significance of mercantile survival/prosperity and E/W employment re-balancing. iA's words are strategically incorrect as Sydney is fragile in mercantile continuum terms, employment in Western Sydney and the Central West of the State are at stake, and logistics requires – demands – special treatment (which TfNSW has never understood, see this analyst's THINKING LOGICAL LOGISTICS II). As iA says in another part of the same document, with its usual schizophrenic duality:

Australia's containerised freight task is projected to (increase) by 165% by 2031, with cities being a primary location for this growth. This will have implications for our urban freight networks... which will impact the future structure of our cities.

4. Another example is hypocritical also as iA's practical work decries regional realities:

The opportunity exists to ease the pressure on our larger cities by growing the populations of the smaller ones. Delivering these solutions will require us to reform how we plan and govern our cities.

5. iA neither understands nor values political commonsense and proper community engagement as the principal driver of successful cities.

An overview of iA's five critical issues follows:

Mission orientation - success in stated objectives against outcome-based PIs?	REALITY
<p>Infrastructure Australia is an independent statutory body that is the key source of research and advice for governments, industry and the community on nationally significant infrastructure needs. It leads reform on key issues including means of financing, delivering and operating infrastructure and how to better plan and utilise infrastructure networks provides the community with accessible information on the potential outcomes of growth and change in their cities</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. iA's board membership was biased towards Infra Partnerships Australia and changes made on this analyst's urging (Birrell, Mrdak and Schott) reduced that risk, but TRANSAC showed there should be no industry/ lobby reps at all – this is a topic to debate
<p>It promised: <i>... a consistent culture of robust and transparent decision making and delivery across infrastructure sectors. Ahead of project selection, we need to improve the evidence base for decision making by increasing the delivery and quality of integrated long-term infrastructure and land-use planning, stakeholder engagement and project development studies.</i> It found</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. iA's governance, corridor reservation and Value Capture work has been second-rate 3. iA has failed to implement rigorous probity and prudential testing including feasibility of valid options since about 2013, indeed has promoted blundering 4. iA refused to consider this analyst's Rescue Plan (see Appendix 1) and other correspondence
<p>Politicisation PM's Crèche DIRD "Cloak of Invisibility" (4-stage sub tabula protection of the GSC), hubristic ES tram disaster, CLARA against potentially more successful model, ideological continuance of amalgamations (related to cultural and political corruptions due to incorrect issue identification and alternative solution assessments), continuation of GSC and misstatement of Greater Brisbane</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Guidelines (in red) at left have <u>never</u> been applied to this analyst's knowledge. (NB Greiner's "zero gate" – also ignored) 2. PMO and Taylor MP announced "Smart Cities Plan" with no mention of impediments*, "30-Minute Cities" created a "cloak of invisibility" for GSC which had released District Plans that were flawed in strategic and spatial terms. No journalist spotted the pattern.
<p>Infrastructure Australia, Australian Infrastructure Plan: Proponents of new infrastructure which do not undertake the prerequisite project development work risk poor outcomes, preventing the community from accessing the infrastructure they require, and restricting economic opportunities.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. iA reviewed WestConnex's Business Case (as finally submitted) and reached wrong conclusions, putting BCR > 1 when SGS had earlier concluded it was <1. iA refused to revise when I found max of 0.7.
<p>Prior to investment decisions, governments should define the problem that needs to be addressed. Problems are identified through long-term integrated infrastructure planning and the analysis of strategic data sources such as Infrastructure Australia's Audit. Once the problem has been defined, early project development studies should then proceed. These include:</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. iA reviewed Bankstown Business Case, did not object to 110 redactions, did not realise public benefits <0 and all costs assigned to speculative profits and unfair land taxes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic options assessments: demonstrate the nature and scale of the problem(s) and identify solutions which may or may not involve the delivery of new infrastructure; • Feasibility studies: undertake engineering, environmental and economic assessments to develop solutions into fully-scoped projects; and • Project business cases: provide more detailed economic assessments, including cost-benefit analysis. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. iA reviewed Green Square after Clover said crisis, they said "national priority", omitted two existing stations (duh) then failed to understand E/W congestion patterns. NSW Planning Minister had conflicted interests and added Metro station w/o iA assessing merits of options
<p>These studies help ensure the right infrastructure solution is selected and that benefits to the community are maximised.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. iA's project priority list does not include details of what has been submitted, how

Infrastructure Australia published the Australian Infrastructure Plan in February 2016. It outlines an evidence-based pathway towards more efficient and productive infrastructure for Australia's future

If we fail to effectively anticipate and respond to growth, the likely results will be declining economic productivity, increasing environmental pressures and a marked reduction in each city's quality of life.

The opportunity exists to ease the pressure on our larger cities by growing the populations of the smaller ones. Delivering these solutions will require us to reform how we plan and govern our cities.

To meet the demands of population growth, cities must rapidly increase the delivery of well-located housing supply and ensure that housing remains affordable to a broad cross-section of the community. Each city will be required to plan for and appropriately locate an expanding jobs market.

Current long-term planning processes for Australia's largest cities generally draw on population and employment projections to produce a metropolitan vision, which paints a high-level picture of what it will be like to live and work in the city in coming decades. These visions are supported by corresponding delivery milestones and policy objectives, such as location-specific targets for the zoning of land to support new housing or the creation of new jobs or the identification of new or upgraded infrastructure.

Progress has been made towards metropolitan governance in Melbourne, beginning in the 1990s, and in Sydney, with more recent local government amalgamations. In addition, in 2015, the NSW Government took a significant step towards metropolitan-level governance with the establishment of the Greater Sydney Commission. The organisation leads metropolitan planning for Greater Sydney and is responsible for delivering the Greater Sydney Region Plan

The community does not have easy access to the necessary tools and analysis to understand the scale of prospective growth, the potential pathways to cater for this growth, and, most importantly, the relative trade-offs associated with different decisions about how each city should grow.

The Australian Government should encourage state and territory governments to focus and prioritise efforts toward achieving full accessibility compliance across public transport networks in Australia's largest cities within defined timeframes.

Australia's largest cities should establish institutions and processes which enable the delivery of metropolitan-scale governance. There are a number of pathways this reform can take, ranging from the establishment of new metropolitan focused agencies, to the amalgamation of existing local councils. The approach adopted should be tailored to match each city's unique characteristics.

Australian governments should adopt a place-based approach when translating metropolitan visions into the sequencing and delivery of development with infrastructure. Opportunities exist for this approach to be applied to the planning, community engagement and governance processes currently used for delivering change at the local level.

This text is a continuation of comments at the right, for spacing reasons:

18. Its affordable housing targets are difficult to achieve where the ownership pattern of new apartments is so risky, apart from the reality that no extra transit capacity will be available. Its commitment to "metrics" lacks a meaningful feedback loop to mega-projects-making which have political/ideological momentum that repels logic
19. Value Capture as mooted will be anti-competitive and impose spatial and intergenerational inequalities. In any case, it is also known as "drip

each accords with guidelines, and why ranks determined. iNSW locks out community (a la WestConnex) through pre-screened access rights. It is not systemically integrated nor economically justified

7. Governance is much talked about but not understood. Brisbane has 5 LGAs (10 in SEQ) and Auckland almost 40 community governments. Rejection of CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION makes this generation a dud, especially iA and CFS.
8. The PM and Ministers, and Premiers and Ministers, give every appearance that they are driven by non-engineering and non-economics "ideological" and lobby motivations.
9. How will iA "require" cities to respond as they are controlled by ossified State Governments.
10. GSC is subservient to Ministerial whim. It is preparing *what the Government will accept* which is no change to Metro or Peninsula absurdities nor to regional disparities. GSC is heavily conflicted with its planning structure omitting municipal officials and its board membership interlinked with "hidden in plain sight" links with Infra Partnerships Australia with its monothematic obsession with the advocacy of tollroads and metros etc, with Planning (setting plans and approving metros and tollroads etc), iNSW with its assessment of metros and tollroads etc, and with GSC which is charged with the implementation of tollroads and metros etc, with . The Chief Commissioners' reported seat in Cabinet must restrict her elsewhere (it didn't work for the spritely and independent Nick Greiner)
11. GSC appears to have no understanding of the capacity and cost differentials between trams and BRT under apple v apple assumptions – BRT is far more effective as well as being much more energy responsible. (It seems it is not allowed to utter "BRT" since 2012's Berejiklian's spat with Greiner – how silly!)
12. GSC has some of the best talent in Sydney among its employees but some notable duds in the clouds as showed by simple internet searches. Its "Three Cities" vision and District Plans are barely relevant when it is realised that:
13. Three Cities means nothing without fundamental changes in infrastructure and commercial and residential "culture" including collapsing small centres into the bigger ones to enable central economics, breaking arterial routes that diffuse movements, and creating new transit "expressnets"[®] around the three nodes where all foreseeable money has been sunk into an unproductive arterial metro network centred on the Sydney CBD
14. GSC's densification in Canterbury-Bankstown lacks a transit or road basis – increased congestion is inevitable as well as

funding”.

20. GSC is a suave sledgehammer – required to force through Government-dictated densifications without demur. Reality would indicate that such a commission should lead, not just follow – see the quotes on the cover of this report. GSC’s survival is essential and a review of its Act should be brought forward.
21. UGNSW makes no pretence that it is anything but a herd of ex-employees from a hard-edged development company/s. It has mismanaged a succession of community interfaces and embarrassed Ministers. It also pushes high-rises as the answer then seeks to garner infrastructure out-of-order and without planning logic. There is no place for UGNSW as a properly-functioning planning regime: priorities would be set as on the right-hand side of the following graphic, then passed to the market for quality decision-making and implementation. As with “planning” and DAs generally, it would be better to revert to the Wran/Greiner 1980 scheme, as it was before Carr & Crew fragmented it under lobby contamination.

Conflicted relationships and consequences e.g. *move from Eddington to Birrell, embedded lobbies and journalists, GSC’s Parra tram and now the Hurstville-to-Olympic Park (what was the history of that!)*

Many communities are not effectively engaging with the broader context of change occurring in their city and as a result they are often opposed to the corresponding local changes in their area that result from broader strategic directions there are often understandable reservations in parts of the community regarding the potentially adverse impacts of population growth and corresponding land-use outcomes, such as increased housing density or longer travel times.

While each process is different, there is a tendency for engagement to be focused on informing, rather than consulting, the community about the change that is going to occur, with the scope for input often limited to small-scale details of the design and implementation. In practice, this means governments fail to capitalise effectively on the potential for communities to contribute valuable local knowledge regarding what problems exist in their areas, and the range of potential solutions to solve them. The community is also more likely to oppose change based on a legitimate feeling that they have not been appropriately involved in the decision-making process.

Competence : e.g. *WestConnex, Green Square tram pointing the wrong way (as does the Barangaroo station), axial densification (and congestion Maginot Line), West Metro and Peninsula uber-tunnel/Manhattanisation inter alia*

The following items are part of the list at right (for space reasons):

5. The inherent complexity between Metro the failure to meet accepted standards of project assessment and the exclusion of consequential damage to the Bradfield-era heritage rail system means that Metro and associated tunnel actual or theoretical funds should not be expended until it is known what the contingent liability from the Bradfield degradation will be. This is a “Catch-22” that is consequential to ideology-based decisionmaking that is so decried by PM Turnbull. Minister Constance should be encouraged to meet his promise to release details of real estate factors in Business Cases which are shams now.
6. System development, the cannibalisation of the Bradfield-era double-decker system, and the risky air-space residential densification of the MTR model, makes Bankstown a potentially disastrous case study: sacrificing the hard-won proceeds of privatisation on a commercially-risky system that is unlikely to meet more than 4% of new dwellings over 15 and more years does not have the ring of success about it.

worsened affordability and heat-sink effects – none analysed by any Government agency and regarded by silo-thinkers as fairy-tale factors

15. They don’t mention known problems and negotiate solutions, Bankstown Airport being a famous and notable case
16. Capricious announcements based on owner profiteering are foisted on it by Ministers, Canterbury Racecourse being the most recent known case
17. GSC uses “productivity” as a measuring stick but the definition is hidden and sits badly with such statements as that Peakhurst (without a rail station) is more productive than Mortdale and Penshurst (both of which have)

1. Technocrats say that “communities do not engage” but ResPublica rightly says that “technocrats do not engage, they use “meaningless consultation”.

2. UK Localism was focussed on getting ossified, stupid bureaucracy out of the way, and Barry O’Farrell agreed, hence my CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION. There needs to be a cleaning-out of State tomfoolery so that communities can create “innovation districts” and reject inept infrastructure which does not service citizens even it feeds corporates.

3. “Place management” was a bureaucratic tool under the Mant model in Adelaide, Fairfield, Liverpool and elsewhere. Newcastle’s and Detroit’s reforms were based on de-bureaucratising place management and integrating community interests in common themes. NSW has lost “willingness to pay” under its stupid LG and Planning reform disasters.

4. iA’s whinges deny Grattan’s findings on poor or absent “pre-planning” which iA seemingly does not understand.

1. All NSW projects have failed probity and prudential protocols and all have avoidable defects. iA has rejected the repair of its systems (appendix 1)

2. RG’s submissions to iA/Turnbull included doing Stages 1 & 2 of iA’s guidelines properly i.e. needs analysis and feasibility testing. That none replied shows that iA and iNSW are ciphers and that Governments are not interested in outcomes based on community values

3. iA and its chairman emphasised the importance of feasibility testing of options and then business cases for short-listed prospects. Its comments on WestConnex suggested that better pre-planning might have reduced costs as well as community rejection. They made no complaints that NSW failed.

<p>Professionalism willingness to listen and amend e.g. Blue Mountains Bankstown Metro (CC's and Berejiklian's political intransigence), and journalistic incompetence</p>	<p>1. Many observers such as Terry Moran, Peter Shergold, Gerry Gleeson and Richard Smyth have commented on the decline in professional standards in "the divide" between ministers and agencies. GSC is fully fused with Fed and State policy-makers to the detriment of NSW citizenry in this analyst's opinion. iA and iNSW cannot justify their budgets while they produce dysfunctional results.</p>
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CITY DEAL BACKGROUND

Barry O'Farrell expressed pro-community policies before the 2011 election but reversed those when Planning Minister Hazzard created "Landcom on steroids" and smashed Anzac Pde and North Shore mainstreets. The Better Planning Network erupted in Lib heartland. Other Ministers had similar disregard to community engagement, especially Transport Minister Berejiklian.

Prime Minister Abbott was interested in Phillip Blond's work in ResPublica, especially "Civic Limits" which is one of the greatest recent guides to better urban democracy. Creative Reconstruction was built around its principles and local and overseas precedents.

City Deals pre-dated full Localism but are mainstream as Professor Richard Tomlinson said in response to the PM's/Baird's announcement:

This is an extraordinary assertion of power over planning for, and infrastructure investment in, cities. It has no constitutional foundation. Australia City Deals are to be based on federal and state/territory partnerships to "drive national priorities tailored to local needs". So, at the local level, national priorities prevail. The federal government knows best. In the UK, City Deals are premised on "devolution" and the creation of metropolitan governments. Deals are negotiated with local and metropolitan governments and business leaders, with reference to civil society as well. Metropolitan governments are seen as desirable because it is believed the economic growth of cities is best promoted by city leadership.

ResPublica put it this way in Restoring Britain's City States:

What has so far been achieved in Manchester and Sheffield signals the beginning of a differential and incremental process that can, in time, lead to full place-based devolution and provide a template for other cities in the UK.

Cities simply lack the necessary control over public resources to shape and design services in order to achieve distinct local outcomes. Consequently, many local communities and individuals experience a system that provides overly prescriptive and reactive services, deeply disjointed and fragmented, with multiple points of access, assessment and referral but with limited continuity of care between agencies and providers. This situation disincentivises local co-operation as delivery organisations compete with each other unnecessarily.

It results in wasteful duplication of ineffective activity across services. It limits innovation and the capacity to adapt to local variations, leading to unintended policy outcomes – solving easier-to-help problems but entrenching others – and, ultimately, poorer services at higher costs. Most importantly, it frustrates the public and undermines the quality of the services they receive, resulting in poorer outcomes and a reduced trust or belief in local and national governance to actually deliver public goods.

A more likely explanation of ongoing central control is the belief that ministers and Parliament should be responsible and accountable. This, along with the fear of what might go wrong, outweighs the impulse to devolve.

It is dispiriting that the Australian style is so manipulative and cynical. The councils in the SW have been robbed and they haven't realised, while the massive benefits to be gained from Bowditch's insight are discarded, in ignorance.

The City Plan was anticipated in iA's "Future Cities – Planning for Population Growth",.

<p>A more likely explanation of ongoing central control is the belief that ministers and Parliament should be</p>	<p>Restoring Britain's City States Over the course of the current Parliament, government</p>
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responsible and accountable. This, along with the fear of what might go wrong, outweighs the impulse to devolve. But if trust must be earned through the competent exercise of powers, it follows that some decentralisation must occur in order for places to demonstrate their capability. Policies for genuine localism must start from change in central government itself, as the Local Government Innovation Task Force has recommended. The behaviour of ministers and civil servants towards local government needs to change to challenge the institutions and processes of public administration and the silo mentality of central government.

has been devolving power and cities have negotiated bespoke deals giving them new powers and freedoms to decide how public money should be spent and allowing greater local control over investment to drive growth, housing, planning, and economic development. At the same time, the new Community Budgets and the rollout of the Government's Troubled Families programme have started to test how bringing together resources and funding for public services at a local level to design integrated services can achieve better outcomes. However, it is the recent agreements on different devolution deals in the combined authorities of Greater Manchester and the Sheffield City Region that could mark a historic turning point in the long-standing call for city-based devolution in the UK. The two deals differ not only in detail but also in their respective governance arrangements. Both build on the successes of their combined authority status and the achievements to date in the delivery of their City Deals (agreed in 2012) and Growth Deals (agreed in 2014).

But if trust must be earned through the competent exercise of powers, it follows that some decentralisation must occur in order for places to demonstrate their capability. Policies for genuine localism must start from change in central government itself, as the Local Government Innovation Task Force has recommended. The behaviour of ministers and civil servants towards local government needs to change to challenge the institutions and processes of public administration and the silo mentality of central government.

Turnbull's creche and Berejiklian's cabal: will they be brought to account? Will Business Cases be proper?

Will the Turnbull Cloak of Invisibility be removed so that communities can be engaged in planning and taxation?

Richard Tomlinson

This is an extraordinary assertion of power over planning for, and infrastructure investment in, cities. It has no constitutional foundation. VFI, however, frees the pens of the drafters of urban policy and the presumptions of their political masters.

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

12/12/2017 New name, new look for latest national urban policy, but same old problem

<http://theconversation.com/new-name-new-look-for-latest-national-urban-policy-but-same-old-problem-59084> 4/4

Cities Kevin Rudd Malcolm Turnbull Devolution Urban infrastructure Infrastructure Australia Urban policy

Vertical fiscal imbalance Smart cities Cities & Policy Angus Taylor decentralisation City Deals City region devolution economic growth of cities is best promoted by city leadership.

However, neither Labor nor Coalition conceptions of national urban policy envisage city leadership serving a metropolitan constituency. Representative, revenue-generating metropolitan government, which can enter the infrastructure finance market, would threaten federal and state power and influence.

Dysfunctional infrastructure planning and funding, ineffectual metropolitan governance and endless blame-shifting poorly serve the creation of competitive and fair cities.

It is at the scale of metropolitan areas where issues pertaining to globalisation, economic competitiveness, social diversity and inequality are embedded.

Labor and the Coalition, at federal and state level, serve metropolitan constituencies with an eye on the next election. Politicians parade trophy projects, services and plans with power, not a

metropolitan perspective, in mind.

There is a wealth of comparative experience to guide us. Effective metropolitan governance requires intergovernmental decentralisation. Metro-scale planning, infrastructure investment and services, and partnerships with the private sector and civil society are best led by a representative and accountable metropolitan government.

An enveloping crypto-political truth came from Professor George Williams, Professor of Law at the University of NSW:

A lack of enforceable rules and an absence of other accountability measures means that political parties are prone to develop into individual fiefdoms. Key figures have been able to distribute power through patronage networks in return for favours.

With Sydney's dominant projects, the "how did this happen?" comes back to a breakdown in the quality of executive government and the increasing influence of corporate lobbies. There has been political and Party discussion of elements of lobbyists but we can see the economic consequences in just transport amounting to many \$ billions of taxpayers' money.

How can this be changed? For a start, iA needs to stop being a cheerleader. Its passages on the Bankstown Metro, West Metro, The Spit and the Waterloo/Green Square have not met professional standards. They are not reproduced here but have been in a special paper.

Classic failures of governmental competence were all cycles in the greyhounds fiasco including the final Cabinet approval, Premiers Baird's then Berjiklian's metro and tram announcements, and The Spit tunnel. In addition, the cross-membership between agencies and lobbies is extraordinary and has to lead to questions as to what each side achieves that they cannot do through transparent but ethical external Chinese Walls as with TRANSAC. A code of interaction between agencies and lobbies is needed, around these principles:

1. Targets: agency or official office/rs with responsibility for decisionmaking and/or advice in an ASIC industry sector/s. Includes ministerial offices, central bodies overseeing agencies, and audit/review roles
2. Lobbyists: industry association, company or individual representing members and commercial interests in the related ASIC sector/s
3. Persons in the target bodies must not
 - a. Attend meetings at or otherwise advise lobbyists
 - b. Communicate in any form with lobbyists
 - c. Accept any favours or gratuities, present or future, from lobbyistsexcept in accordance with PMC guidelines and real-time, on-line public reporting.

Then the housing patterns inherent in different rail development strategies have to be assessed independently of Government for reasons stated in the Grattan's *Roads to Riches*

The Hon Paul Fletcher MP has released a Messiah statement on the outcome of two years' work on the Western Sydney City Deal. The English approach had been adapted by officials in the Prime Minister's Office and is under trial, with WS being the most significant but Darwin, Hobart and others following.

There is a genuine challenge because of a long history of mishaps and misbehaviours at State and latterly Federal levels. This started with two failed transit schemes in 1995, evolved through bankrupt tunnels and underwhelming freeway sections, strategic reviews which promised better probity, then political capriciousness leading to engineering and economic controversy over every NSW project since 2008.

This might be the greatest con job in history:

The gatekeepers are now Treasury albeit weakened which is under the Treasurer who is a Metro-spruiker, and the Minister for Infrastructure who is Minister for Transport, ditto.

The Premier has taken personal control over land development associated with Metros; and the Greater Sydney Commission is bound to obey Government directions.

Underlying the above, planning myopia means politicians cannot see past their noses, they see what they can see today but not into the future. Spatial blindness means they think about what they can see, not what lies beyond the innercity boundaries to the great expanses of Sydney's suburbs and industries.

Malcolm Turnbull used the term “anachronistic spatial determinism” which seems to apply to both. Overlying all is the degradation of the NSW public sector since the 1980s and the increasing dominance in project selection – rather than policy formulation - of populist politicians.

These terms matter because Sydney lacks planning credibility and robust infrastructure pipelines. There is a recognition that each sub-region of Sydney has its own needs but there is a strategic imperative to re-balance the State urban budget, with key projects at the core guaranteed but with other projects managed through the capabilities of the regions.

The GSC’s draft District Plans describe problem situations with studied understatement but then say how they could be addressed, not solved (example is Bankstown considering MANS and Leda controversy, both raised issues).

Their overarching concept of “Three Cities” has no merit in terms of social, demographic, employment or systems changes not in the Government’s plans, which means none at all.

There are no protections against non-pecuniary conflicts of interest. This topic has been widely discussed and is potentially vital given the scope and depth of the Commission’s involvements. In the case of pecuniary conflicts, absencing oneself from particular matters might not be sufficient protection of the public interest given that major rezonings and infrastructure matters will be involved (and remembering ICAC investigations).

Neither the Greater Sydney Commission nor iA/iNSW have published a metropolitan or district assessment matrix, which matches risks with options, effectiveness scores and cost projections; so neither can say their context and project discussions give the basis for an “evidence-based” approach that will solve problems – indeed, the Metros, light rail, road and taxation streams will cause problems that are not even acknowledged.

Its Districts are a bit eccentric, for example “West Central” is not central West and it’s not west of central, it’s Blacktown, parts of the former Auburn, Parramatta and Holroyd, parts of the former Parramatta, The Hills, Auburn, Holroyd and Hornsby, and The Hills.

There is a perception that the overseas-lobbyists’ Rottweilers are shaking the Labor and Coalition Labrador puppies and winning every which way. It is 8 years since O’Farrell promised the “end the stench” and reform local government and planning in sensible directions; 7 years since Greiner started to reverse stupidity in project planning; 6 years since Lambert and Schott produced the Commission of Audit reports; and 4 years since we were promised

Example of not solving a long-term issue:

We are aware that the long-term strategic positioning of Bankstown Airport including land will need a strategic focus. We will work with the NSW Government, local councils and, where appropriate, the Australian Government in the development of the long-term strategy for this important area.

Examples of “preaching” (NB involved in housing decisions? – above):

In addition to the general guidance in A Plan for Growing Sydney, we propose the following criteria for investigating urban renewal corridors:

- *Alignment with investment in regional and district infrastructure. This acknowledges the catalytic impacts of infrastructure such as Sydney Metro Northwest and Sydney Metro City & Southwest, NorthConnex, WestConnex, Sydney CBD and South East Light Rail, Parramatta Light Rail, Northern Beaches Hospital and any future NSW Government investments. It also acknowledges the opportunities created by enhancements to existing infrastructure.*

The NSW Government has announced a new underground metro railway line will be built between Parramatta City and Sydney City to help cater for Sydney’s growth. Sydney Metro West will provide a direct connection between Parramatta City and Sydney City, linking communities not previously serviced by rail as well as supporting growth between the two major centres.

The Sydney Metro West project will focus ... because of the greater potential to transform communities, create new ones and link them using a new state-of-the-art public transport system. Beyond this corridor, opportunities to extend the line east and west will also be considered.

NB West Metro is a travesty of failed procedures

Accessibility to regional transport, noting that high-frequency transport services can create efficient connections to local transport services and expand the catchment area of people who can access regional transport within a decent travel time.

Emphasise “can”

In the week that WestConnex has been revealed to have failed at Port Botany and KSA:

The WestConnex project has been designed to improve freight movements in the South District.

the “most exciting urban redevelopment project in the world”. As with all areas, we have gone backwards such that the cranes in the air presage problems, not achievement, and waste exceeds \$30,000,000,000.

The Grattan Institute reviewed NSW’s lack of pre-planning, non-adherence to probity protocols and poor engineering, and recommended a start of divorcing Ministers from project planning and implementation cycles. That is reminiscent of practices under legendary Ministers Milton Morris and Peter Cox – and is strongly supported.

The politicians who have messed-up and continue to distort planning need to be brought to democratic account.

It has not been appreciated that GSC gives a statutory effect to the City Deal:

District planning must also consider priorities identified by the Minister for Planning and other relevant plans, strategies and NSW Government policies including:

- the Premier’s and State Priorities (September 2015) that seek to create jobs, encourage business investment and increase housing supply
- the Ministerial Statement of Priorities (January 2016) that includes strategic planning for Parramatta, Penrith, Liverpool and Campbelltown
- updates to the State Infrastructure Plans for 2015/16 and 2016/17
- the Western Sydney City Deal (Memorandum of Understanding signed October 2016)
- the initiatives of Jobs for NSW.

The 1980 Environmental Planning & Assessment Act of the Wran Government, continued by the Greiner Government, gave a clear hierarchy and clarity which was lost under the Carr and subsequent Governments.

We must not lose sight of “planning” in talking about “projects”. The latter exist to progress community well-being rather than individual corporates’ profits. The point was well-made by the PIA and PCA in 2009:

Planning Institute 2009:

Ad hoc, project-by-project decision-making does not constitute planning, and could pre-empt the best transport solution. Decisions significantly affecting the development of Sydney, such as on the Metro projects, cannot be made without an overall long-term metropolitan plan. Sydney is too important.

Nick Greiner 2013:

The land use plan should have come first ... There’s no point Transport doing its masterplan ... if you haven’t worked out where jobs are and where people are ... So the Metro Plan was supposed to happen along with our SIS ... so clearly that’s a bit arse-about

Property Council 2009:

NSW has stumbled along for years without a comprehensive transport plan for Sydney. NSW has planned project by project with no big picture to set priorities and look at overall system management. It’s time to bite the bullet, admit past mistakes and develop an integrated long term transport plan for Sydney.

This author did his first study of the corridor for the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads in 1984, and been involved ever since. In particular he gave the then Minister for Transport a roads, rail and o-bahn integrated strategy in 1979; and the NRMA “Towards a Transport Vision for Sydney” in 1995. He defers appropriately to Christie (2001 and 2010) and Greiner (2012).

The Metro carries with it tax proposals that will affect intergenerational and spatial equity. It will negatively affect parameters where the Prime Minister said his policies will have a positive effect, namely reduce congestion, “no place for ideology”, improve iA integrity, urban innovation, and housing affordability. Attention to professional standards and care for outcomes are required much more than for (say) a local hospital development.

The Bankstown Metro extension is here **“red flagged”** – a PAUSE is needed urgently, with consideration of how the money can be better spent.

Current practice is the opposite. GSC is required to accept the Government’s decisions, good or bad, without question. The whole Metro program turned into a rush to catch-up - the community has not been told the true implications of the Bankstown Metro extension including to Liverpool, even the “summary” business case had major gaps and 110 redactions, making it all but useless. The most important elements were put to the then Mayor of Bankstown who blanched when I asked him if he had analysed these parameters (slightly updated):

1. Increase the cost past \$20 billion without factoring in the massive social and employment costs of closing rail lines and stations for up to a year, cannibalising the Bradfield-era railways, demolishing 50 large buildings to put in new underground stations where stations already exist, and forcing transfers at major rail nodes making a 2016 version of the 19th Century “dual gauge” problem – impeding special events and emergency operations as well! Platform and track sections are to be removed and replaced (realised so late in the process – yet vehicles are available that would not require such costs and disruption while also extending services well past the narrow band of suburbs, faster and more cheaply). Economic and operational damage to the Bradfield system has not been costed. **Better use of existing assets is supposed to be an iA priority yet it endorsed the opposite**
2. Concentrate residential high-rises in a narrow band of suburbs (increasing congestion, not served by the Metro past about 1% of 664,000 new dwellings over just 15 years) [as it was then]. This is commercially risky, socially irresponsible, and worst of all, to be paid for by families and small businesses through a tax that has been promoted, without understanding it seems, by the Prime Minister, the Premier, the Committee for Sydney and the McKell Institute among others. Better, cheaper and easier to implement options are deliberately ignored – projects, technologies and taxes. Two classes of suburbs and citizens will be created. The beneficiaries? – the contractors, financiers and developers.
3. Reduce the network’s passenger capacity (especially as the Bradfield system is being cannibalised) while falsely claiming the Metros will provide a 60% increase – the numbers were provided by a private operator, indeed a contractor with a vested interest, which distorted the comparison between double-decked trains and metros by about 95%. **That canard was repeated by iA which presumably did not check the numbers or understand Sydney** despite the issues being ventilated by ABC Fact Checkers, Ron Christie (former Rail Coordinator General) and the ABC’s Lateline, as well as being formally submitted to Ministers and governmental inquiries. (Metro’s changes to proposed timetables were surreptitious and meaningless.)
4. **Forced the projects on communities through non-elected bureaucrats in statutory agencies which have defective legislation** especially UrbanGrowth and the Greater Sydney Commission.

These points were also put to the Administrators and other Mayors who declined to respond. The Metro’s housing densification targets in each of the Bankstown’s Line 11 stations have been found to be *inappropriate through to impossible*.

There are better options which were ignored by the national and NSW Governments and agencies. The main option is to leave the three east/west rail lines to be foundation axes for corridor improvement; and develop a known but latent north/south axis – with east/west linkages - to allow a **new and additional band** of more traditional medium density development.

The same but possibly more powerful “cost effectiveness” logic applies to the West Metro myth, The Spit long tunnel, and various extravagant road and tram projects, all of which have options not considered by the NSW Government or iA.

C) Independent Option

- Delivery of a dedicated metro system, independent from the existing Sydney rail network, including a new Harbour Crossing and CBD line.
- The Independent Option would deliver the benefits of rapid transit services to customers only on new lines. It does not deliver significant benefits to the wider rail network.
- In the Sydney context an independent metro system would deliver few benefits in terms of service enhancement, capacity improvements or better operating efficiency on the existing rail network. A dedicated metro-style system would not maximise the use of the existing rail assets. It would create a separate system that would divert funding away from service improvements on the existing rail network and only provide benefits to customers who use the new lines.

Berejiklian’s *Sydney’s Rail Future* brochure in June ’12 (which ignored the Hurstville to Strathfield option that would take trains out of central networks) described an independent Metro as unsuited to Sydney (see box at left).

The Metro’s own presentations paint a different picture. The media have noticed unresolved issues including what happens on either side of the Metro’s sequestration of the Bradfield-era track sections. The Metro website has this text (as in March ’17):

Sydney Metro City & Southwest is fully segregated from the existing Sydney Trains railway tracks between Sydenham and Bankstown, improving the reliability of services. The T3 Line west beyond Bankstown would continue to be operated by Sydney Trains...

This confusion lay at the centre of GSC's non-performance. It adopted Berejikian's prescription even though it made no sense; but after sustained criticism it went in the Bedrock direction this contradicting Berejikian. But it's too late, GSC effectively turned up on the wrong day for the start of the cross-country and found itself in the wrong race, period.

The myths, or "elephants in the room" remaining include:

- **That a second rail crossing of the Harbour is necessary** when the real need is for a N/S connection to the west of the CBD – like the one already there between Rhodes and Meadowbank on the Main North Line. There is no point in pumping more commuters into the centre only to send them out again but that is exactly what the TfNSW/Metro Black Box "thinkers" do
- **That the extravagant closure then reconstruction of suburban lines to run metro trains is necessary.** Metros can and do run in heavy rail corridors elsewhere and should do here. 50 large buildings are being demolished, with massive congestion and environmental damage, unnecessarily. Both Christie and the iNSW reports focussed on upgrading train and signalling controls on the existing network and that remains the real priority. Running metros then becomes easier. The saving would be in the billions.

Intergenerational equity means we pass on a better world than we inherited. It also means that we don't pass on dead debt to our descendants. The NSW Government is breaching every possible guideline:

1. Metros will change urban structure to increase congestion and worsen housing affordability – servicing no more than 5%, and more likely 1%, of population growth with 100% of the transit budget is monumentally stupid
2. Metros will damage the Bradfield-era system which the Government is glossing over – that disregard for responsibility amounts to near maladministration
3. Real social dislocation will come from over-densification in terms of private and public places and heat sinks/energy irresponsibility. Terraces will be under-serviced and discouraged
4. Value Capture will create two classes of living places and generations
5. Metros will use up so much capital that better technologies will be neglected, reducing proportional transit usage (cf Christie's 50% more by 2021)
6. The metro has chosen a technology that will inflict unnecessary financial waste on coming generations
7. Community cynicism will worsen, creating political instability and growing community rejection of conjoined agencies and commercial lobbies
8. The agencies involved will not be able to contribute positively once amalgamated councils exercise their base values – increasingly NIMBYism and fringe parties holding casting votes

Perhaps worst of all, the Bairdian generation is the first in Australia to seek to destroy earlier generations' earnest efforts to improve Sydney. JDF's lifetime commitment has been betrayed –

Already, Sydney, like London, has spilt, "like a viscid bowl", its teeming populations over a great territory, with a continuous stream of men and houses all the way to Parramatta. What its future will be, we can only conjecture. But that it will be a great one who can doubt? [then] ... those who love Sydney (will) strive to the end (to ensure) that there shall be a competent municipal body created, whose duty it will be to direct the city of the future into its rightful path, to foster a civic spirit, to root out parochial prejudice, and bind all interests together in a common civic patriotism.

That spirit has been replaced by commercial domination of public policy and budgetary processes. The "outcomes" point to failures at all levels of Government; and the lessons to be learnt from Bankstown, Epping, Parramatta, Surry Hills and Newcastle should be disseminated across societal, academic, political, business and environmental sectors.

Let not the Bankstown case study be an example of where Governments refused to acknowledge and adjust to "unintended consequences", once known, of their political decisions.

The process started with the exclusion of local government but appears now to have been hijacked; but with a conspicuous lack of strategic thinking and economic & engineering nous.

There is still no metropolitan “plan” with clear, integrated intentions which have community support. The issues are a microcosm of Sydney’s decline as an effective State/metropolitan conjunction, showing

- The public sector being de-skilled and under-motivated due to changes in culture forced by inept Party politicians (as described by three former D-Gs and the legendary Gerry Gleeson)
- The business and professional communities having lost their sense of community purpose and professional values especially compared with Sydney’s great Reform Generation of Sir Thomas Hughes, Sir Allen Taylor and Jack Fitzgerald among others
- Ministerial interventions via press releases defeating the essence of “planning”, especially via “Landcom on steroids”, such as UGNSW’s plans for North Parramatta (endorsed by then Minister) which was cut by 30% by the next Minister but still imposing some 3,000 apartments in buildings up to 24 storeys in a heritage zone. The *Plan for Growing Sydney* is not a plan, it is a japa stormjacket protecting developers from residents, with the Greater Sydney Commission being the enforcer
- iA joining in the Berejiklian push of the Metromeisters’ West Metro with its massive \$ bill and long if not death-dealing delay, in a manner that pleases the Western Sydney Business Chamber and WS Leaders Dialogue (Metro refugees from Labor’s days) but which must increase community cynicism against the recommendation of (say) Dr Garry Bowditch
- UrbanGrowth NSW pushing out-of-priority residential densification and Metro/tram placements along Anzac Pde, around Green Square, along Parramatta Road and in such spots as Pyrmont, and doing them clumsily, producing community resistance and then Ministerial back-downs
- The Urban Taskforce aggressively pushing high-rises everywhere but especially in The Bays which is nowhere near Parra Road; but with it opposing levies on developers; producing governmental and community resistance
- The Greater Sydney Commission doing anything/anywhere the Metro and WestConnex require, which are also not Parra Road, with the Administrator of ParraCity calling for more initiative such as a real strategy instead of a “three cities” ideological waffle and the Innerwest Administrator
- The Innerwest Administrator trying to organise a BRT system that cannot work by itself
- Governments rejecting/ignoring Christie’s, Leighton/Easson’s/Keneally’s and Greiner’s iNSW’s alternative schemes, and
- communities fighting densification especially as the Metro will not “serve” existing schools and congestion zones (unless it gives up a wider coverage that supports terraces) and will impose betterment tax levies as opposed to the inner eastern and northern privileged ‘burbs which did not have to pay them.

These are no over-statements: “*the Emperor has no clothes.*” The Metro is in the context of a disorganised WestConnex which reportedly has generated some 200 community groups along its length. As iA put it, “*A more comprehensive options analysis may have identified [its] evolutions or other approaches earlier in the planning and delivery process, potentially mitigating some risks around project certainty and scope*”. The over-valuation of savings in travel time might have distorted economic analyses which, if true, would be a classic case of “*nonsense on stilts*” (Peter Self).