

CITY & REGIONAL FUTURES – IS IT TIME TO DISSOLVE THE URBAN CONSPIRATORS’ SMOKE ‘n’ MIRRORS, AND RESTORE REGIONS AS A VIABLE FORCE?

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Amid the Barnaby woes, after John Barilaro’s call for the PM’s resignation by last Christmas and Berejiklian’s stripping of regional funds from Rebuild NSW, and NSW Nat leaders’ failure to come to grips with their Lib patrones’ urban obsessions, iA released “*Future Cities – planning for population growth*”.

The media reported it as having dire predictions and prescriptions for Sydney, including the failure of the mega-billion “30-Minute City” and the need to extend local government amalgamations (as a continuation of a failed “ideological and stupid” prejudice (PM’s term)). This is after Baird’s mistakes and aggression were debunked. iA had pointed to the continuation of failed processes in its previous reports, but now they and the Greater Sydney Commission’s missteps have been papered-over. Those “missing” mistakes have strategic implications and include

- *adverse outcomes from all tram and WestConnex construction phases and soon Metros’*
- *a waste of \$30 billion since Greiner’s forced departure in 2012 with no congestion and housing “plan”*
- *unprecedented community dissent around all aspects of the “infrastructure pipeline”, and*
- *capricious unfunded urban announcements (without pre-validation) amounting to \$80 billion and rising, with no system for assessing the comparative merits of, say, continuing to bury money in ripping-up the Bradfield tracks versus strengthening the State’s response to the Inland Rail Bridge, at stake being economic sustainability and political acceptance.*

After a decade of discussions about resolving long-term governance issues, the report shows how poor the results have been. In 2009 journalist Mark Coultan pointed to Labor’s failure to learn from its repeated “*blowing the state’s fortunes on the centre of the city, to the disadvantage of the majority*”.

A major example of the way the Government has failed to plan properly is the “innerwest” corridor between Parramatta and Victoria Roads and including The Bays. Ten years ago the news reports were full of Labor’s CBD Metro, Albanese’s Green Metro and Parramatta Road trams. For the last five years, we had West Metro, Parra Road “trackless trams” and Google at White Bay – “*the most exciting urban redevelopment scheme in the world*” according to PM Turnbull and Mike Baird. Now the scene is simpler, Berejiklian has decreed that we will only have the West Metro.

If PM Turnbull, the Chief Commissioner of the Greater Sydney Commission, and NSW Premier Berejiklian have their way, that Metro will be built under The Bays in an echo of Labor’s CBD Metro (the “*fiasco*”, the “*stench*” the Coalition called it). The Government has not done the sums to refute a conservative claim that its scenario is a waste of \$30,000,000,000 and probably 10+ years, compared with local options, as well as death knell for reducing congestion and making housing more affordable. Given that regions are 2/3rds under-funded (at least), there is no justification for sucking such money into unproductive urban projects instead of support inland rejuvenation.

That is a microcosm of a World City that has a very big “city budget” but no City Plan that balances priorities, budgets, projects and living conditions across all places, city and country. Here is the situation as it was in 2009 and *as it still is*:

Planning Institute 2009:

Ad hoc, project-by-project decision-making does not constitute planning, and could pre-empt the best transport solution. Decisions significantly affecting the development of Sydney, such as on the Metro projects, cannot be made without an overall long-term metropolitan plan. Sydney is too important.

Nick Greiner 2013:

The land use plan should have come first ... There’s no point Transport doing its Masterplan .. if you haven’t worked out where jobs are and where people are ... So the Metro Plan was supposed to happen along with our SIS ... so clearly that’s a bit arse-about

Property Council 2009:

NSW has stumbled along for years without a comprehensive transport plan for Sydney. NSW has planned project by project with no big picture to set priorities and look at overall system management. It’s time to bite the bullet, admit past mistakes and develop an integrated long term transport plan for Sydney.

iA’s report contains even more of the same undisciplined bucket of unfunded promises. It emerged as a “surprise present”, or not, for the Greater Sydney Commission which is advocating the continuance of existing ideological mistakes at the expenses of balanced priority-setting. It argues for accurate information to the community but included some projects which are infeasible (with no project assumptions being stated, a serious defect), and omitted other, more prospective options. It explicitly omitted logistics which is intrinsically related to re-balancing of employment; and did not account for the effects of political incompetence on such areas as dissent and electoral instability, and unwillingness to pay.

The initial Executive Director of the main infrastructure lobby, Dr Gary Bowditch, agrees (below) with the current analyst’s view that this is the most important challenge; yet the current Federal and State Governments live in a Cone of Silence where they crush community protest through unelected agencies as though client-corporates own democracy, and recuse themselves from expert, independent wisdom. It is an unhappy reflection to say that no member of relevant Federal and State Government posts has shown a critical facility in the matters discussed here.

The PM's and GSC's "30-Minute City" and "Three Cities" have been analysed in a detailed paper and concluded to be part of a "cloak of invisibility" designed to distract journalists and communities while the infrastructure lobbies roll on regardless of iA and Treasury guidelines. For this and other reasons, iA's and GSC's roles are regarded as being fundamentally deficient and the report as misleading.

This paper talks about Sydney but the essence is, there is no "city plan" which meshes available funds over time, with different housing and infrastructure patterns in the cities and in the regions, and effective governance processes which defeat lobby-driven waste and re-democratise NSW.

WHERE DID IA GO WRONG

Specific inconsistencies and errors will be outlined later. Generally, the assessment of the iA report has to take account of five critical issues which this analyst raised in correspondence with the PM and entourage, and NSW and its fused Ministers and agencies, namely:

- **Mission orientation:** success in stated objectives against outcome-based PIs?
- **Politicisation:** PM's Crèche DIRD "Cloak of Invisibility" (4-stage sub tabula protection of the GSC), hubristic ES tram disaster, CLARA against potentially more successful model, ideological continuance of amalgamations (related to cultural and political corruptions due to incorrect issue identification and alternative solution assessments), continuation of GSC and misstatement of Greater Brisbane
- **Conflicted relationships and consequences:** e.g. move from Eddington to Birrell, embedded lobbies and journalists, GSC's Parra tram and now the Hurstville-to-Olympic Park (what was the history of that!)
- **Competence:** e.g. WestConnex, Green Square tram pointing the wrong way (as does the Barangaroo station), axial densification (and congestion Maginot Line), West Metro and Peninsula uber-tunnel/Manhattanisation inter alia
- **Professionalism:** willingness to listen and amend e.g. Blue Mountains Bankstown Metro (Lucy Turnbull's and Berejiklian's political intransigence), and journalistic incompetence

The principal characteristics of transport "projects" since about 1995 were that "projects" were divorced from "city planning", without meeting Treasury Guidelines on Economic Appraisal ("engineering & economics"), but dictating the exclusion of **options** in accord with the PM's derogatory term "ideology and stupidity". Labor rolled the non-system out through two failed motorway PPPs, railway disorders and the crowning glory, the "stench" of its metros which erupted from a unit within Premier & Cabinet. At about the same time, lobbyists invaded a declining Executive Service, making for "corruption in plain view". It is now common for the same faces to appear on competing planning, operational, regulatory and banking boards; and for personal relationships to obviate impartiality.

Here is an overview of indications of dysfunctionalities associated with the "patrones' urban obsessions":

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| • Metros costing c \$40 billion will serve no more than 5% of growth over 15 years, inconsistent with Smart Cities | • Metros will have no capacity for higher population past 15 years – do not widen service spread/flexibility | • WestConnex will be out of capacity by 2031 without scope for improvement, and is inconsistent with Smart Cities |
| • Metros will reduce capacity relative to population and could run on Bradfield tracks so waste is massive | • Forced HK densification will raise costs and congestion + heat sink effect = slumification | • All business cases were based on deceit, secrecy and error – non-compliant with iA protocols |
| • All options were excluded especially faster/cheaper/more effective*, East Hills Line was the better choice | • Value Capture is inequitable and inefficient, contrary to Lib policies, and commercial risks are high | • There is no agency that meets professional, holistic and respected standards for City or project planning |
| • 40% of the patronage of the Bradfield CityRail patronage will be force-changed to metros, meaning unbelievable commuting and special events disruptions and uncosted and even hidden intergenerational damage to the economics and finances of the railways, disrespect of the Tom Hughes/JDF/Bradfield Reform Generation, and international disgrace for the Bairdijiklian Generation – the first to be a wrecker of inherited assets instead of a Wran/Greiner builder of stronger systems. That this was the first Federal Government to <u>encourage</u> dependant misbehaviour is also regrettable (versus The Snowy in 1949, Pyrmont/Glebe demolitions, Tasmanian Dams, the Metro Light Rail and the Labor Metros). | | |

* The new iA report emphasises the scope for "sweating" but has no relevance as iA has always said that and never enforced it.

As the iA and other Federal and NSW reports assume the continuation of current directions, without amendment, even where engineering and economic performance has been appalling and housing targets lack credibility (such as Campsie's 67 high-rise blocks where there are none now), it is important to recap.

The COAG instruction in 2009 to prepare a "City Plan" was rejected in 2012. The Current Prime Minister had relied on intelligent but inexperienced people (the Crèche) to write a widely-criticised "Smart Cities" framework, and placed political cadres in key advisory and executive roles, as though failure is the prime criterion for appointment. The NSW Premier led that way and now has 100% domination of policy channels through placement of compliant cadres. The Greater Sydney Commission is compliant with its political masters' whims and now is drifting between its pre-set Metro- and tram-based vision and this

analyst's EDDINGTON BEDROCK which is based on holistic improvement and genuine innovation – *faster, cheaper and more effective*.

There are conflicted connections among and through Federal and State networks which are contrary to ICAC guidelines and the PM's own comments in his Water portfolio, that lobby representatives with vested interests on boards can be expected to pursue their vested interests.

The Crèche's Smart Cities' "30-Minute City" (with GSC) is not achievable as their projects have costs exceeding benefits while their current iNSW/GSC protocols and politically-determined project directions cripple future generations' financial and engineering capacities to improve. You've seen expressions of this analyst's scope of work including FAUX AMALGAMATIONS, EDDINGTON BEDROCK – FROM CHRISTIE TO GREINER TO GIBBONS, CASE TO PAUSE THE METROS, DESTRUCTIVE DECEIT IN CHANGING SYDNEY WITHOUT ELECTORAL MANDATE, REPOSITION BEREJIKLIAN APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES & PROJECTS, BROKEN DEMOCRACY, and WHY THE PENINSULA HAS EVERY RIGHT TO FEEL AGGRIEVED WITH BAIRD *inter alia*.

iA has added instances of filching of this analyst's IP to Baird's 6 and TfNSW's/GSC's 4 and still counting. All conflicted and unethical parties should be brought to account for the first time.

That I am a prophet in the wilderness, a Bedouin raider, a Jack Reacher sniper, while a major contributor to previous Governments' achievements, can be traced to Baird's IP theft and bastardisation in 2008, his and PM Turnbull's betrayal of pioneering work on ReviveBlueMountains and on logistics and urban reform, and the Coalition's ministers, advisors', cliques' and journalistic groupthink's rejection of professional and fairness-based engagement with me – all to the political and economic disadvantage of the Coalition at NSW and Federal levels. (It is interesting to note that "greater" is iA's favourite adjective, instead of "more", "higher" or "better" etc – they must take their patrones' predilections very seriously.)

ROUTE ASSUMPTIONS

Scenario-testing is sensitive to the valuations behind parameters so it is usual to state assumptions and the results of sensitivity testing. iA has done neither. Moreover, it used labels without stating their meaning. There have been many breaches of Business Case guidelines including by iA and a smart agency would know by now that such omissions are intolerable.

For reference, these passages reflects iA's lack of historical and practical expertise as well as tendency to blamange:

While Australian governments are increasingly using scenario tools, it has yet to become an established practice when planning for our cities, and there has been only a limited sample of this work made publicly available.... In reality, a complex interplay of policy decisions and unforeseen factors will shape the long-term development of Australia's cities.

The scenario analysis shows that well-planned cities... will deliver the best outcomes for Australian communities. ... if our largest cities are going to successfully respond to growth, changes to their structure and operation, and the processes used to deliver these, will be needed.

iA claims to have discovered scenario testing as though it is new, except, possibly, the first use in Sydney was the RTA's *Future Directions* about 25 years ago (SATS preceded it). That this analyst has been pounding it as an essential tool in community engagement (as with Eddington in London and Melbourne), is beside the point, especially as the current Governments have jettisoned engagement in their amalgamations obsession. iA is now too late as fundamental project and policy "decisions" have been made on capricious and even destructive grounds – lobby- and corporate-driven – and dug-in by obsessive stakeholders.

The same naiveté is demonstrated in iA's "This process is the first time long-term infrastructure and land-use planning have been developed in concert for Sydney." This is as stupid as the Committee for Sydney's erroneous assertion it had inspired the "emergence of the first metropolitan coordination structure Sydney has seen in the form of the Greater Sydney Commission". And GSC's own, of the Badgerys airport, that for the "first time in over 100 years, this major catalyst will provide the opportunity to change the shape and structure of an extensive area of Greater Sydney".

The second paragraph is a more accurate description of how Sydney has developed and is continuing under the developer-led, plan-less and capricious mess of projects being inflicted by tri-governmental incompetence and fused politicians and agencies. The call for change is hypocritical as iA has recused itself from all communications with this analyst.

Scenario testing would have changed these three contexts and all others:

Bankstown/ Green Square Metro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Airport Link has two stations but Metro will put in one more and iA sees additional tram as essential but pointing to CBD instead of reducing congestion between Newtown and say Bondi Junction. The Bankstown extension was decided by the project team (TfNSW advice) which is weird, undemocratic and inept – they didn't realise they'd "have" to "straighten" platforms, massively increasing costs – but all unnecessarily according to German expert 	<p>No known needs analysis of E/W demand (cross-regional), focus is on CBD axis which may be "stupid". iA was appealing Berejiklian and especially LM Moore w/o logic or analysis of options. PM has special liking for trams.</p> <p>Metro: "public" benefit/cost ratio appears to be about 0. Commercially very risky, tax basis would be inequitable and inefficient. Greiner and Christie proposed rapid transit on upgraded Bradfield lines, with capacity of 40,000 passengers per hour in each direction, RG suggests extension to Badgerys[®]. The West Metro is a "white elephant" and its cost burden prejudices more logical options.</p>
West Metro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Labor idea, one of many on the merry-go-round, a "lot of money" has been spent out-of-sequence (attacked by Grattan as pushing up costs) – but it reduces investor and community confidence. David Borger's "there's no downside" was typical cant. Goanna Transit Bridge out of RG's work Vs Labor is cost-effective and very useful, that it is neglected is a sign of psychological defects as well's as UGNSW's hubris in stopping all development. 	<p>Might be valid but there are many internal options and no testing of the main Christie/Greiner one which has major advantages. Berejiklian rejects all of RG's work <i>ex cathedra</i> and thereby lost Google and 16,000 housing units</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Goanna has a different function in space, "local solution" councils also tricked into naming rights over a long-term and improbably Metro monstrosity instead of understanding the basics Berejiklian's rejection of Google (Turnbull/Baird "most exciting urban redevelopment in the world") replaced by RG's The Fireworks – a potential wonderful Joint Venture for NSW
Barangaroo ExpressNet [®]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linking of the street transit systems (bus and tram) on the eastern and western sides of the CBD via street systems and the construction of a curved Goanna Transit Bridge[®] from above Barangaroo to Rozelle off the tips of headlands (minimising land disruption). Its "mother" bridge was built 10 years ago at Coalcliff, costing just \$60 million. Extending for length, the Goanna would cost about \$500 million – cheap for its great value Resolution of CBD congestion by the elimination of 7 E/W conflicted intersections through a circumferential road and transit boulevard – where the Jan Gehl and George St tram schemes worsened the realities 	<p>Provision of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> fast transit through The Bays to the Victoria Road corridor at Rozelle, including the Overseas Passenger Terminal and White Bay Power Station (the Google site, now foregone due to delays in providing transit enablement) Relief of the ANZAC Bridge (and speeding-up buses) which is about to experience 20% more congestion off the WestConnex works Walking and cycling in extension of current programs, and The basis of a long-term fast Flexity Swifta or similar tram/trains system ("expressnet") to link street and rail transit systems. (This is urban innovation but of a type well-known in Europe, checked by a former Bombardier senior engineer.) One stream could run to Victoria Road and thence North Ryde; the other via Norton Street and back to Central via three universities and two regional shopping/services centres.

Since Google's departure, the concept of The Fireworks[®] apartment and mixed-use tower was developed by RG. This might be 110 floors in height with the Goanna Bridge going through its middle, creating a transit and retail/services structure over several floors. Two vertical firing pipes would allow spectacular fire curtains to harmonise with the Harbour Bridge's firework curtain. The configuration would be developed by a Joint Venture: the Goanna is an "un-locking" stratagem. Other firing sites through the CBD are horizontal.

However, to maintain iA's spirit, here are some comments on what iA says it has based its technically-limited scenario-testing on.

It needs to be remembered that Berejiklian's promises are heading towards \$100 billion un-funded with rumours coming out of TfNSW of even bigger catastrophes ahead (such as tunnelling under Razorback's shale). The SMH's informed leak on the WS City Deal mentions \$30 billion for the new north-south line (outer orbital), of which the sponsoring CEO of WSROC decried iA protocols (reflecting Carl Scully's contempt for due process and exploiting Liberal influence circles), and it bears no relationship to "30-Minute City". In terms of priority, it is probably classic "ideology and stupidity" as is WSROC's position.

Savings to be gained from proper procedures are very significant – a minimum of \$30 billion since Greiner was forced out in 2012 including the 2nd Harbour Crossing which was out of priority order and unnecessary had the Hurstville-to-Strathfield line been included as urged in BEDROCK. (That it now has nominally snuck in the back door is shameful.)

The Crossing only gained primary political ranking because of Berejiklian's 2012 NW Tunnel blunder (and Government and media lack of awareness). This analyst regularly makes the point that the Governments cannot question his cost calculations as they have not even done their own.) The mention of Hurstville is snide, see quotes from the *Daily Telegraph* following.

iA admitted that "The implications of poor practice are substantial. Research completed by the University of Melbourne's Next Generation Engagement Project has found that around \$20 billion in infrastructure projects have been delayed, cancelled or mothballed due to community opposition over the past decade". That is superficial and Grattan have put a higher cost on the effects of poor engineering and managerial practices including the lack of pre-planning (cf WestConnex, ES tram, Bankstown and all metros, and Parra tramways.

The F6 reference is important. The Grattan Institute rightly saw the Eastern Suburbs tram as worthy of special investigation as an indicator of a "negligent" approach which showed uninformed value-laden public statements from two government leaders; but ignoring Brereton's and Rockdale City's work on the F6 shows how anal the Road administration is. In addition, non-observance of probity protocols shows the Government has learnt nothing from WestConnex – changes in Tempe are significant enough to require a new Business Case in accordance with Guidelines. The following needs updating due to the last few back-of-the-envelope changes-of-mind:

Redirecting traffic, saving open space



The F6 alignment was developed by the then DMR before Laurie Brereton built his electorate's expressway system.

The old alignment would stress innerwest suburbs such as Tempe and Newtown which are always heavily trafficked anyway.

The revised alignment, which was adopted as policy by Rockdale City Council in 2005, would re-direct southern traffic via a "local standard" road (capacity being maximised at about 27 kmh average speed) onto Brereton's roads which are engineered to handle them better than the Princes Highway.

The Grand Parade would become a transit boulevard with a quality BRT system (designed by RG). The RTA resisted all these for no good reason and the RMS has maintained that "tunnel vision" to Sydney's detriment. Only an Eddington-type inquiry could redress that – benefits/savings would be in the \$billions.

The Transport Long Term Master Plan in 2012 was the start of Berejiklian's ideology-led and probity-light "strategic" statements. (One on *Rail Futures* lasted less than a month, of course, June to July 2012). At the time the executive (now CEO of Planning) refused to consider Gibbons' work, leading to "Transport thinking stuck in bureaucratic black box" (DT 5 Apr '12), and Andrew Clennell cited their arrogant failure to consider options in his classic "Liberal Bromance between Barry O'Farrell and Nick Greiner hits great divide" (DT 29 Oct '12):

submissions to Berejiklian's draft transport masterplan closed on Friday but Transport for NSW is not even expected to make those submissions public. One, from a former head of planning at the transport department Robert Gibbons, released to The Daily Telegraph, suggests a Hurstville to Strathfield train line could take pressure off a second Harbour rail crossing and a Maldon-Dombarton rail line could service Port Kembla in terms of freight and take the pressure off traffic around Port Botany.

iA has accepted, without due and proper consideration, the following Bairdijiklian specials in Low Density even though not relevant to it

ROAD	Comments - NB remember Grattan Roads to Riches
Beaches Link	unlegitimised bias, ignores 2008 and DOTARS
Bringelly Rd Stg 2	inevitable
M5 West upgrade	inevitable
NorthConnex	inevitable
Northern Rd Upgrade	inevitable
Outer Sydney Orbital	explain, if M10 then politically-led
Sth Connector M'way (F6?)	ignores defects
WestConnex all stages	ignores out of capacity & Goanna option
Western Harbour Tunnel	unlegitimised bias
Western Syd Infra Plan	explain
Parra Rd BRT	same wrong model as dumped by Berejiklian?
RAIL	Comments - NB remember Grattan Roads to Riches
Bankstown-L'pool High Capacity Upgrade	East Hills is higher priority
Metro NW City SW	Lack merit and legitimacy
West Metro	Inferior to Goanna + iNSW/Chrsitie upgrading of Main West
Badgerys-Campbelltown	Not properly considered against logistics ex Maldon-Dombarton
Badgerys-Leppington	How justified? See also above
Badgerys-St Marys	How justified? See also above
Hurstville-Olympic Park (not in Low Density)	Misses most important adaptive innovation opportunity*
Parramatta tram Stage 2	Not in Low Density but misses point of ParraCity's earlier work * cf Eddington Bedrock

Roads to Riches proposed that (after political authorisation) politicians be divorced from project development until results are tabled in Parliament. NSW's poor record and the current lack of Federal counterbalancing leads to support for Grattan around a wider set of options.

Gibbons argues both the transport masterplan and the State Infrastructure Strategy have failed to properly take into account those two projects, which when last assessed would cost about \$1 billion each.

A spokesman for Transport for NSW did not give a commitment to release the submissions. "Transport for NSW will collate his latest feedback and make a decision on the most appropriate way to present all of this information with the final masterplan."

Of course all such ideas were filtered out (ditto local government and planning reviews – and Labor’s Blueprint too, part of the long-term decline in public sector competency.) There has been no apparent official revisiting of these issues although one can see cracks in the carapace but always without recognition of or reward to the thinker as with the Hurstville inner-orbital (which Ron Christie admitted he would have included in 2001 but forgot to).

IA’S CLAIMS – following many detailed expressions to them, all ignored (albeit part-filched)

It was observed that:

1. iA is sufficiently up-to-date to include unannounced City Deal contents (it has twice written to this analyst saying “iA is not involved in planning Western Sydney”) but has left in the Parramatta Road BRT that was technically deficient and dumped by Berejiklian in her obsessive pursuit of the West Metro
2. iA has included options that are sub-standard and excluded better options – neither independent nor professional
3. iA excluded logistics on the grounds of practical measurement but that is incorrect and denies the significance of mercantile survival/prosperity and E/W employment re-balancing. iA’s words are strategically incorrect as Sydney is fragile in mercantile continuum terms, employment in Western Sydney and the Central West of the State are at stake, and logistics requires – demands – special treatment (which TfNSW has never understood, see this analyst’s THINKING LOGICAL LOGISTICS II). As iA says in another part of the same document, with its usual schizophrenic duality:

Australia’s containerised freight task is projected to (increase) by 165% by 2031, with cities being a primary location for this growth. This will have implications for our urban freight networks... which will impact the future structure of our cities.

4. Another example is hypocritical also as iA’s practical work decries regional realities:

The opportunity exists to ease the pressure on our larger cities by growing the populations of the smaller ones. Delivering these solutions will require us to reform how we plan and govern our cities.
5. iA neither understands nor values political commonsense and proper community engagement as the principal driver of successful cities.

An overview of the five critical issues follows:

Mission orientation success in stated objectives against outcome-based PIs?	REALITY
<p>Infrastructure Australia is an independent statutory body that is the key source of research and advice for governments, industry and the community on nationally significant infrastructure needs. It leads reform on key issues including means of financing, delivering and operating infrastructure and how to better plan and utilise infrastructure networks provides the community with accessible information on the potential outcomes of growth and change in their cities</p> <p>It promised: <i>... a consistent culture of robust and transparent decision making and delivery across infrastructure sectors. Ahead of project selection, we need to improve the evidence base for decision making by increasing the delivery and quality of integrated long-term infrastructure and land-use planning, stakeholder engagement and project development studies.</i> <i>It found</i></p> <p>Politicisation PM’s Crèche DIRD “Cloak of Invisibility” (4-stage sub tabula protection of the GSC), hubristic ES tram disaster, CLARA against potentially more successful model, ideological continuance of amalgamations (related to cultural and political corruptions due to incorrect issue identification and alternative solution assessments), continuation of GSC and misstatement of Greater Brisbane</p> <p>Infrastructure Australia, <i>Australian Infrastructure Plan:</i> <i>Proponents of new infrastructure which do not undertake the prerequisite project development work risk poor outcomes, preventing the community from accessing the infrastructure they require, and restricting economic opportunities.</i> <i>Prior to investment decisions, governments should define the problem that needs to be addressed. Problems are identified through long-term integrated infrastructure planning and the analysis of strategic data sources such as Infrastructure Australia’s</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. iA’s board membership was biased towards Infra Partnerships Australia and changes made on this analyst’s urging (Birrell, Mrdak and Schott) reduced that risk, but TRANSAC showed there should be no industry/ lobby reps at all – this is a topic to debate 2. iA’s governance, corridor reservation and Value Capture work has been second-rate 3. iA has failed to implement rigorous probity and prudential testing including feasibility of valid options since about 2013, indeed has promoted blundering 4. iA refused to consider this analyst’s Rescue Plan (see Appendix 1) and other correspondence <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Guidelines (in red) at left have never been applied to this analyst’s knowledge. (NB Greiner’s “zero gate” – also ignored)</i> 2. PMO and Taylor MP announced “Smart Cities Plan” with no mention of impediments*, “30-Minute Cities” created a “cloak of invisibility” for GSC which had released District Plans that were flawed in strategic and spatial terms. No journalist spotted the pattern. 3. iA reviewed WestConnex’s Business Case (as finally submitted) and reached wrong conclusions, putting BCR > 1 when SGS had earlier concluded it was <1. iA refused to revise when I found max of 0.7.

Audit. Once the problem has been defined, early project development studies should then proceed. These include:

- Strategic options assessments: demonstrate the nature and scale of the problem(s) and identify solutions which may or may not involve the delivery of new infrastructure;
- Feasibility studies: undertake engineering, environmental and economic assessments to develop solutions into fully-scoped projects; and
- Project business cases: provide more detailed economic assessments, including cost-benefit analysis.

These studies help ensure the right infrastructure solution is selected and that benefits to the community are maximised.

Infrastructure Australia published the Australian Infrastructure Plan in February 2016. It outlines an evidence-based pathway towards more efficient and productive infrastructure for Australia's future

If we fail to effectively anticipate and respond to growth, the likely results will be declining economic productivity, increasing environmental pressures and a marked reduction in each city's quality of life.

The opportunity exists to ease the pressure on our larger cities by growing the populations of the smaller ones. Delivering these solutions will require us to reform how we plan and govern our cities.

To meet the demands of population growth, cities must rapidly increase the delivery of well-located housing supply and ensure that housing remains affordable to a broad cross-section of the community. Each city will be required to plan for and appropriately locate an expanding jobs market.

Current long-term planning processes for Australia's largest cities generally draw on population and employment projections to produce a metropolitan vision, which paints a high-level picture of what it will be like to live and work in the city in coming decades. These visions are supported by corresponding delivery milestones and policy objectives, such as location-specific targets for the zoning of land to support new housing or the creation of new jobs or the identification of new or upgraded infrastructure.

Progress has been made towards metropolitan governance in Melbourne, beginning in the 1990s, and in Sydney, with more recent local government amalgamations. In addition, in 2015, the NSW Government took a significant step towards metropolitan-level governance with the establishment of the Greater Sydney Commission. The organisation leads metropolitan planning for Greater Sydney and is responsible for delivering the Greater Sydney Region Plan

The community does not have easy access to the necessary tools and analysis to understand the scale of prospective growth, the potential pathways to cater for this growth, and, most importantly, the relative trade-offs associated with different decisions about how each city should grow.

The Australian Government should encourage state and territory governments to focus and prioritise efforts toward achieving full accessibility compliance across public transport networks in Australia's largest cities within defined timeframes.

Australia's largest cities should establish institutions and processes which enable the delivery of metropolitan-scale governance. There are a number of pathways this reform can take, ranging from the establishment of new metropolitan focused agencies, to the amalgamation of existing local councils. The approach adopted should be tailored to match each city's unique characteristics.

Australian governments should adopt a place-based approach when translating metropolitan visions into the sequencing and delivery of development with infrastructure. Opportunities exist for this approach to be applied to the planning, community engagement and governance processes currently used for delivering change at the local level.

This text is a continuation of comments at the right, for spacing reasons:

18. Its affordable housing targets are difficult to achieve where the ownership

4. iA reviewed Bankstown Business Case, did not object to 110 redactions, did not realise public benefits <0 and all costs assigned to speculative profits and unfair land taxes
5. iA reviewed Green Square after Clover said crisis, they said "national priority", omitted two existing stations (duh) then failed to understand E/W congestion patterns. NSW Planning Minister had conflicted interests and added Metro station w/o iA assessing merits of options
6. iA's project priority list does not include details of what has been submitted, how each accords with guidelines, and why ranks determined. iNSW locks out community (a la WestConnex) through pre-screened access rights. It is not systemically integrated nor economically justified
7. Governance is much talked about but not understood. Brisbane has 5 LGAs (10 in SEQ) and Auckland almost 40 community governments. Rejection of CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION makes this generation a dud, especially iA and CfS.
8. The PM and Ministers, and Premiers and Ministers, give every appearance that they are driven by non-engineering and non-economics "ideological" and lobby motivations.
9. How will iA "require" cities to respond as they are controlled by ossified State Governments.
10. GSC is subservient to Ministerial whim. It is preparing *what the Government will accept* which is no change to Metro or Peninsula absurdities nor to regional disparities. GSC is heavily conflicted with its planning structure omitting municipal officials and its board membership interlinked with "hidden in plain sight" links with Infra Partnerships Australia with its monothematic obsession with the advocacy of tollroads and metros etc, with Planning (setting plans and approving metros and tollroads etc), iNSW with its assessment of metros and tollroads etc, and with GSC which is charged with the implementation of tollroads and metros etc, with . The Chief Commissioners' reported seat in Cabinet must restrict her elsewhere (it didn't work for the spritely and independent Nick Greiner)
11. GSC appears to have no understanding of the capacity and cost differentials between trams and BRT under apple v apple assumptions – BRT is far more effective as well as being much more energy responsible. (It seems it is not allowed to utter "BRT" since 2012's Berejiklian's spat with Greiner – how silly!)
12. GSC has some of the best talent in Sydney among its employees but some notable duds in the clouds as showed by simple internet searches. Its "Three Cities" vision and District Plans are barely relevant when it is realised that:
13. Three Cities means nothing without fundamental changes in infrastructure and commercial and residential "culture" including collapsing small centres into the bigger ones to enable central economics, breaking arterial routes that diffuse movements, and creating new transit "expressnets"® around the three nodes where all foreseeable money has been sunk into an unproductive arterial metro

pattern of new apartments is so risky, apart from the reality that no extra transit capacity will be available. Its commitment to “metrics” lacks a meaningful feedback loop to mega-projects-making which have political/ideological momentum that repels logic

19. Value Capture as mooted will be anti-competitive and impose spatial and intergenerational inequalities. In any case, it is also known as “drip funding”.
20. GSC is a suave sledgehammer – required to force through Government-dictated densifications without demur. Reality would indicate that such a commission should lead, not just follow – see the quotes on the cover of this report. GSC’s survival is essential and a review of its Act should be brought forward.
21. UGNSW makes no pretence that it is anything but a herd of ex-employees from a hard-edged development company/s. It has mismanaged a succession of community interfaces and embarrassed Ministers. It also pushes high-rises as the answer then seeks to garner infrastructure out-of-order and without planning logic. There is no place for UGNSW is a properly-functioning planning regime: priorities would be set as on the right-hand side of the following graphic, then passed to the market for quality decision-making and implementation. As with “planning” and DAs generally, it would be better to revert to the Wran/Greiner 1980 scheme, as it was before Carr & Crew fragmented it under lobby contamination.

Conflicted relationships and consequences e.g. *move from Eddington to Birrell, embedded lobbies and journalists, GSC’s Parra tram and now the Hurstville-to-Olympic Park (what was the history of that!)*

Many communities are not effectively engaging with the broader context of change occurring in their city and as a result they are often opposed to the corresponding local changes in their area that result from broader strategic directions there are often understandable reservations in parts of the community regarding the potentially adverse impacts of population growth and corresponding land-use outcomes, such as increased housing density or longer travel times.

While each process is different, there is a tendency for engagement to be focused on informing, rather than consulting, the community about the change that is going to occur, with the scope for input often limited to small-scale details of the design and implementation. In practice, this means governments fail to capitalise effectively on the potential for communities to contribute valuable local knowledge regarding what problems exist in their areas, and the range of potential solutions to solve them. The community is also more likely to oppose change based on a legitimate feeling that they have not been appropriately involved in the decision-making process.

Competence : e.g. *WestConnex, Green Square tram pointing the wrong way (as does the Barangaroo station), axial densification (and congestion Maginot Line), West Metro and Peninsula uber-tunnel/Manhattanisation inter alia*

The following items are part of the list at right (for space reasons):

5. The inherent complexity between Metro the failure to meet accepted standards of project assessment and the exclusion of consequential damage to the Bradfield-era heritage rail system means that Metro and associated tunnel actual or theoretical funds should not be expended until it is known what the contingent liability from the Bradfield degradation will be. This is a “Catch-22” that is consequential to ideology-based decisionmaking that is so decried by PM Turnbull. Minister Constance should be encouraged to meet his promise to release details of real estate factors in Business Cases which are shams now.
6. System development, the cannibalisation of the Bradfield-era double-decker system, and the risky air-space residential densification of the MTR model, makes Bankstown a potentially disastrous case study: sacrificing the hard-won proceeds of privatisation on a commercially-risky system that is unlikely to meet more than 4% of new dwellings over 15 and more years does not have the ring of success about it.

Professionalism willingness to listen and amend e.g. *Blue Mountains Bankstown Metro (Lucy Turnbull’s and Berejiklian’s political intransigence), and*

network centred on the Sydney CBD

14. GSC’s densification in Canterbury-Bankstown lacks a transit or road basis – increased congestion is inevitable as well as worsened affordability and heat-sink effects – none analysed by any Government agency and regarded by silo-thinkers as fairy-tale factors
15. They don’t mention known problems and negotiate solutions, Bankstown Airport being a famous and notable case
16. Capricious announcements based on owner profiteering are foisted on it by Ministers, Canterbury Racecourse being the most recent known case
17. GSC uses “productivity” as a measuring stick but the definition is hidden and sits badly with such statements as that Peakhurst (without a rail station) is more productive than Mortdale and Penshurst (both of which have)

1. Technocrats say that “communities do not engage” but ResPublica rightly says that “technocrats do not engage, they use “meaningless consultation”.
2. UK Localism was focussed on getting ossified, stupid bureaucracy out of the way, and Barry O’Farrell agreed, hence my CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION. There needs to be a cleaning-out of State tomfoolery so that communities can create “innovation districts” and reject inept infrastructure which does not service citizens even it feeds corporates.
3. “Place management” was a bureaucratic tool under the Mant model in Adelaide, Fairfield, Liverpool and elsewhere. Newcastle’s and Detroit’s reforms were based on de-bureaucratising place management and integrating community interests in common themes. NSW has lost “willingness to pay” under its stupid LG and Planning reform disasters.
4. iA’s whinges deny Grattan’s findings on poor or absent “pre-planning” which iA plainly does not understand.
1. All NSW projects have failed probity and prudential protocols and all have avoidable defects. iA has rejected the repair of its systems (appendix 1)

2. RG’s submissions to iA/Turnbull included doing Stages 1 & 2 of iA’s guidelines properly i.e. needs analysis and feasibility testing. That none replied shows that iA and iNSW are ciphers and that Governments are not interested in outcomes based on community values
3. iA and its chairman emphasised the importance of feasibility testing of options and then business cases for short-listed prospects. Its comments on WestConnex suggested that better pre-planning might have reduced costs as well as community rejection. They made no complaints that NSW failed.

1. Many observers such as Terry Moran, Peter Shergold, Gerry Gleeson and Richard Smyth

have commented on the decline in professional standards in “the divide” between ministers and agencies. GSC is fully fused with Fed and State policy-makers to the detriment of NSW citizenry in this analyst’s opinion. iA and iNSW cannot justify their budgets while they produce dysfunctional results.

2. Bruce Loder’s prescription follows in the next block:

The late, great Bruce Loder said it best in “Poor vision for the state in the blurring of the divide” - SMH on 10 April 2008:

Unfortunately, the Roads and Traffic Authority failed in its role as guardian of the public interest probably because, in common with the rest of the public service, it no longer has the ability to do so.

Both the Cross City and Lane Cove tunnels are ill-conceived and doubtful economically. It goes without saying that neither are financially viable as toll roads. The Lane Cove Tunnel has the further defect of virtually eliminating Epping Road as an effective link in the Sydney Metropolitan road system. In effect a toll is being levied on a previously existing untolled road - a technique used only as a means of limiting vehicular access to a centre as in Singapore and London.

The deterioration in management and skills in the public service exemplified in the Roads and Traffic Authority extends throughout the service and explains in part the problems of delivery being experienced in health, transport and public works.

*It will not be easy to restore the public service to an effective provider of works and services and guardian of the public interest, but until then and **until the roles of government and public service are once more clearly defined, we can expect the standard of government in NSW to continue to decline and the quality of services in NSW to continue to fall relative to other states.***

The Grattan Institute’s Roads to Riches was a neat demolition of the dominant stupidity (PM’s term) in the infrastructure cycle, both federal and state:

If Premier Baird wants his legacy projects to finish on budget, he should demand much more than closer monitoring of costs as projects are built. **The actions that would really make a difference would be to curb his fellow politicians from promising to spend public money before a business case and project evaluation have been tabled in the Parliament, and to publish the post-completion report on projects afterwards. Then perhaps Mike Baird [Berejiklian] could be the Australian premier that finally nails “on time and on budget”.**

The unfortunate reality is that the following chart has to be presented in public due to the recusal of official stakeholders to traditional professional discourse.

The text is small and I apologise in advance; however it is comparatively simple compared to the full chronologies:

**What is the project cycle meant to look like? Vs evasions and perversions?
Interactions between PM, iA and NSW: leadership & discipline defects**

Barry O'Farrell Promises	2011 - 12	The stench returns - NSW fused with PM Turnbull -----> 2015 - Baird takes over -----> 2016 -----> 2017 - Berejiklian takes over ---->		
Stench Barry O'Farrell 2010: We will put an end to the stench that has surrounded [Labor] for more than a decade during which [ideas] were drawn up on the back on envelopes before media conferences ...not... the actual needs of the taxpayers, citizens and our economy" Gladys Berejiklian said the metros were doomed. "We want to reassure the community - if we do win the next election, our absolute priorities will be to construct the north-west and south-west rail links."	iNSW under Greiner set up and sets a vision for a clean and fast project pipeline - applauded by Stephen Cartwright of NSW Business Chamber. Malcolm Turnbull's desires for trams are contrary to Greiner. Berejiklian appoints metro lobbyists to staff and TfNSW committee - then breaks NW promise. Author of inadequate L/T Transport Plan appointed to head of Planning Greiner and Broad depart when Berejiklian and BOF override them over trams on George St and NW Rail (iNSW confirming Treasurer Costa/Jim Steers' rejection in '08)	Election: no mention Bankstown closures, no dropping of Illawarra, no removal of Bradfield system revealed - still yet. Later - Baird announces 2nd Xing will exclude normal trains. Newcastle Herald reveals multiple errors in Baird Budgets GSC created with heavy conflicts via ex officio and other directors and silo powers (LG excluded) NSW Business Chamber refuses to support better LG model, reinstatement of Greiner protocols, and reversal of thier transport policies into an Eddington model --> --> --> 2014 - housing targets go up (UGNSW) then down (Minister Stokes), Illawarra already excluded as an error, now long closure of Bankstown line revealed due to unknown straightening of platforms	WestConnex erupts then Baird promises West Metro (back of envelope, ignored iA). iA wrong conclusions on WestConnex business case - refuses to revise Poles and wires for regions - 2/3rds underfunded. Baird announces new Western Tunnel and extension from Rozelle to Allambie Heights w/o meeting iA requirements or considering densification damage to beach culture Does nothing abt 20,000 cars or 20% onto Anzac Bridge off WestConnex PM releases "Smart Cities" which is a cloak of invisibility over NSW errors (including TfNSW, DOPE and GSC). RG advised PM of conflicted links that cause serious malfunctions. PM and NSW make no real changes PM gives Budget \$78.3 million to Parra tram out of priority order, \$8.4 billion to (part only of) inland rail	Berejiklian promises reach c \$80 billion from the \$15.9 billion but later the secret Razorback tunnel added some \$20 billion = \$100 billion and rising Berejiklian appoints her Transport cheerleaders to all key planning/property roles, ensuring capricious decisions are not appraised, PM does same PM/Baird/Berejiklian refuse to consider Gibbons Rescue Plan for iA and Peace Plan for PM + Google knew and was frustrated, they left. PM mute but recruits Baird/Berejiklian "advisor" (to repeat their errors?) PM sets up investment unit within PMC, adds to city unit already there (repeats Vicinc and WAinc error). PM splits "urban" between Nats' Barnaby and Libs' Fletcher. Feb 2018: iA releases pro-GSC analysis of growth implications, no mention of strategic defects, pinches 3 RG ideas, strange omissions
Return power to communities Berejiklian - will listen Lucy T - below	Berejiklian's rejection of Greiner pushes her smoke 'n' mirrors model across the board	Councils sacked in LGAs affected by metro, WestConnex and CSG protests, by Baird and Nat underling and Ministers intimidated	Grattan analyses ES tram and other cost over-runs, and finds that NSW approach is negligent. iA refuses to consider RG "Rescue Plan".	Mrdak leaves DIRD (focus on Infra P'ship Aus) Birrell, Schott leave iA (same focus) Berejiklian takes personal control of commercial land dealings - conducive to corruption
Abolish Part 3A Lucy Turnbull Only by becoming involved can the city's residents ensure that the nature of the growth and development of Sydney is as good as our city and its people deserve	Hazzard's "Landcom on steroids" to over-ride communities which resist densification UrbanGrowth starts to push densification under chair John Brogden, starting in ES tram corridor - fails there as elsewhere	Greater Sydney Commission created to the promise it will over-ride councils which oppose densification plans --> iA starts to politicise its treatment of NSW/PM political priorities such as WestConnex, Parra and Green Square trams, Bankstown and West Metros, and Northern Beaches/Western Tunnel slop	GSC adopts full Govt package and forces WestConnex and Metro damages. Chief Commissioner deeply embarrassed by extensive damage to historic Haberfield "garden suburb". Canterbury-Bankstown Priority zone erupts on TV and print media - 67 new high-rises in Campsie alone! Both show lack of "orderly development" which is CSG's core accountability. SMH: "More than two-thirds of people believe Sydney is full and property development should be pushed to the fringes, new polling shows, amid simmering tensions within communities and the Berejiklian government over the issue. With plans for hundreds of thousands of apartments in the city's "priority precincts" over the next 20 years, the ReachTel poll ... shows 66.4 per cent of NSW residents oppose more development in existing areas"	
Dr Gary Bowditch Community support and trust towards credible infrastructure plans must be earned with sound community engagement and better customer service outcomes... not just a focus on assets and projects. This is by far Australia's most pressing infrastructure imperative.	Activation Zones - fail in Kensington and Parramatta Road LGSA/LGMA conspiracy proceeds with mayoral privilege campaign	The Bays/Google ICON - UGNSW runs an unsuccessful transport ideas competition, tries to pinch Goanna Bridge, freezes Bays til 2021 PUSH fights Berejiklian blunder re Devonshire St, Berejiklian bashes her way through. RG reveals failure of GSC housing target process ---->	Nth Parra tram project erupts, unfunded and illegitimate yet heritage pub demolished PM Turnbull makes special Budget allocation of \$78.3 million to GSC's unlegitimised Parramatta tram project	Berejiklian says she will push through all opposition to metros. The Age reveals Berejiklian Govt instructed planners to remove transit from F6 options - gross breach of PM's dicta Bankstown and innerwest councils still refuse to listen to better advice on transport solution
	Hazzard Planning Act mess breeds "Better Planning Network"	About 200 resident action groups start local campaigning	Berejiklian rejects all criticisms, will not listen, will push Metros through	CC Lucy Turnbull says she will push her reports through, "no dust will gather"

The solutions have been set out in volumes within the SAVE SYDNEY suite. There seems to be little chance that the leopard will change its spots, that regions will get a fair share of funding, or that unfunded promises will curry favour; and with a State election looming in March 2019 (Fed possibly only 10 months hence), Mark Coultan's words seems to be the most apposite:

"NSW... is an effective one-party democracy. All things being equal, Labor almost always wins NSW elections. The Liberals are there to share the spoils of parliamentary office, occasionally threatening ... Unless, that is, Labor so comprehensively stuffs things up that the electorate decides it must be punished.... Both times the characteristic of the failing government was a perception that it was blowing the state's fortunes on the centre of the city, to the disadvantage of the majority."

"... it is not so much the project itself but the priority it has been given that represents the misallocation of resources".

"The politics of the Rozelle metro must have the hard heads at the ALP head office - if there are any left - scratching their heads. By the next election the only thing the Government will have to show for its efforts will be resumed properties, lucrative construction deals, and the prospect of years of construction noise for local residents".

Mark came to advise Berejiklian, one hoped that they realise that evasion and PR will no more save them that Labor found – but no, Mark departed.

I seek fairness after a long period of unfairness from Baird and Berejiklian and devote my abilities and skills to the people of Sydney and Australia, my fellow citizens. The fair value of the IP in the SAVE SYDNEY suite grossly exceeds the likely cost of acquisition.

Mr Mark Birrell
Chairman
Infrastructure Australia (iA)

Robert Gibbons

revitalisesydney@gmail.com

0408 112001

15 August 2016

cc

by email

Last opportunity for iAustralia
to
convert its mistakes into a positive Reconstruct Sydney® program

I refer to my email of 26 February 2016 headed “Message for Chairman” and a web form input headed “Perfect storm – governmental attack on Sydney’s sustainability” dated 2 May 2016, neither of which has been replied to. I am acting in accordance with the Prime Minister’s dictum,

*If you want anyone to change, you have to persuade them they have a problem.
Then you have to explain the solution.*

Malcolm Turnbull July 2014

I will now persuade you of **problems** in brief terms and presage a complete analysis should you again not respond. The **solution set** is probably the most significant contribution made by an individual for almost a hundred years:

The “Improvement” approach of the world’s greatest City Council, Sydney’s from 1900 to 1912, led by Sir Thomas Hughes and inspired by Jack Fitzgerald, has been updated for Sydney in Creative Reconstruction of NSW Local Governance and in The Greater Sydney Commission’s Fate in Prospect (i.e. failure) – the most profound thinking in Australia in peer opinions. It covers land use/ housing/transport/taxation/engagement in holistic terms. The transport program including RG’s own ideas for the CBD, The Bays, Parramatta Road, Bondi Beach and Broadway is in The Eddington Bedrock: from Christie to Greiner to Gibbons and The Case to Pause the Metros, while logistics per se is in Eastern Seaboard Logical Logistics 2 (#1 was Thanking Logical Logistics for Globestar Shipping). Regional and tourism reform is encapsulated in ReviveBlueMountains. All are brought together in the Revitalise booklet and imminent website.

This suite is available to iA under negotiated terms, as part of a “Sydney Reconstruction” theme (to build on the Improvement Commission of 1908-09). That this is needed because existing arrangements have failed can be debated in all media.

PROBLEMS:

1. No planning system - still

iA itself adopted a positive set of intentions albeit its first funding cycle (and subsequent ones) was replete with political interventions. iA has promised:

... a consistent culture of robust and transparent decision making and delivery across infrastructure sectors. Ahead of project selection, we need to improve the evidence base for decision making by increasing the delivery and quality of integrated long-term infrastructure and land-use planning, stakeholder engagement and project development studies

That is demonstrably not the case in practice, especially in relation to Metro trains and freeway linkages under State Governments, iA and specific senior Federal elected and appointed officials. Substantial criticism along these lines came from the NSW Commission of Audit; and private discussions with them in early February produced real surprise at the Metro’s written advice that it still had not prepared a business case. iA endorsed the Metro in its 2016 Report despite the above and others’ warnings. There is no evidence-based process – within government that is – that recognises problems and develops the best system- and place-based options for community engagement. The Planning Institute’s views in 2009 on the disastrous CBD Metro still apply to the Metro – which has gone through no financial, planning, environmental, engineering statutory process:

Ad hoc, project-by-project decision-making does not constitute planning, and could pre-empt the best transport solution. Decisions significantly affecting the development of Sydney, such as on the Metro projects, cannot be made without an overall long-term metropolitan plan. Sydney is too important.

The pause is the same call made by the Property Council in 2009. Add this respected commentator’s conclusion:

Community support and trust towards credible infrastructure plans must be earned with sound community engagement and better customer service outcomes. These must form the central plank of the new long-term infrastructure-planning regime, not just a focus on assets and projects. This is by far Australia’s most pressing infrastructure imperative (Dr Garry Bowditch)

Another dimension was expressed in the SMH on 11 August 2006 in “Government developer 'hopes like hell' he can build affordable housing in Sydney”, which included

The NSW government has been facing growing calls to introduce new measures to boost the supply of affordable housing. Former premier Nick Greiner has advocated for measures to encourage housing for households on average incomes, while property developers have indicated some support for the idea.... it would be hard to allocate a proportion of new developments to affordable housing "because there is no state government policy in relation to how we are going to do this". "Lucy and I and our corporations are working absolutely fervently to try to bring this about, and we would be looking to bring some really meaningful piece of work in the middle of next year," Mr Pitchford (UGNSW) said."

The reality is, this is a flawed process based on poor projects and a commercial model that has been analysed by Professor Bill Randolph and others, with the conclusion it failed to provide affordable housing. NSW Treasury warned of such circumstances in its Guidelines if business cases were not produced early and revised with substantial changes – “... to avoid implementing a project that has negative net benefits.... For large projects, a preliminary economic appraisal may be required, and subsequently updated as new material and data become available”. Yet that is what iNSW and iA appeared to have allowed.

The 2011 NSW Election promised the introduction of better project and engagement practices than had been experienced under Labor but the actuality is more like this:

iA and iNSW as well as NSW and UK Treasury guidelines require an early business case showing proper consideration of options, measurement of parameters through accepted economic and related tools, and engagement of stakeholders. Senior Ministers in the NSW Government have shared the key portfolio responsibilities covering transport and main roads (Infrastructure included as a secondary element). How well did they go?


	Treasury			Transport			Premier		
	Options	Ratios	Engagement	Options	Ratios	Engagement	Options	Ratios	Engagement
Baird	X	X	X	-	-	-	X	X	X
Berejiklian	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Constance	X	X	X	X	X	X			

Did well
 ⊖ Dubious, to be debated
 ✗ Failure

Note: Eddington in London and Melbourne got 3 ticks, Christie 1, 1 dubious and fail on engagement

Jim Steer’s study of the NW Metro showed a heavily negative BCR and there is no reason to believe the current Metro will be better: this shows the peril of not following procedures, of hiding such external costs associated with the cannibalisation of the Bradfield rail system (especially compared with simply running metro trains on it), and of not learning from history. iA’s reality – and implementing the Prime Minister’s promise to reduce congestion, reject ideological limitation and be mode-neutral, and improve productivity.

The Government is building a grab-bag of road projects under the “WestConnex” banner while ignoring better local solutions especially on the eastern side, hiding information from the community after its “business case” was produced too late and derided for its quality, and worsening congestion in major locales while ignoring other congestion hot-spots. All the while car dependency and punitive tolls are worsened. All these factors are illustrated and explained in the fore-mentioned documents. A major focus is the reduction of congestion, the costs of which is also highlighted in your Reports but without solutions. The core structure of strategies in the proprietary documents is like this:



It is suggested that iA’s 2016 Report should have read like this:

Labor produced Metro mayhem in the 2000s which the then Opposition called a “fiasco”, never to be repeated, “No boardroom or CEO in the private sector would be permitted to get away with such incompetence” – then they not just repeated it, they ignored Treasury, iAustralia and iNSW and even Grattan recommendations on sound practices, and are on course to creating dreadful and unnecessary chaos:

- a. Increase the cost past \$20 billion without factoring in the massive social and employment costs of closing rail lines and stations for up to a year, demolishing 50 large buildings to put in new underground stations where stations already exist, and forcing transfers at major rail nodes making a 2016 version of the 19th Century “dual gauge” problem – impeding special events and emergency operations as well! Platform and track sections are to be removed and replaced as the chosen vehicles need a clear line of sight – yet vehicles are available that would not require such costs and disruption while also extending services well past the narrow band of suburbs. Better use of existing assets is supposed to be an iA priority yet it endorses the opposite
- b. Concentrate residential high-rises in a narrow band of suburbs (increasing congestion, not served by the Metro past about 1% of 664,000 new dwellings over just 15 years). This is commercially risky, socially irresponsible, and worst of all, to be born by families and small businesses through a tax that has been promoted, without understanding it seems, by the Prime Minister, the Premier, the Committee for Sydney and the McKell Institute among others. Better, cheaper and easier to implement options are deliberately ignored – projects, technologies and taxes. Two classes of suburbs and citizens will be created. Labor gave birth to this monstrosity, the Coalition nurtured it, and now Labor mistakenly feeds it hot blood. The beneficiaries? – the contractors, financiers and developers, not citizens. Politicians cover their backsides. The identity confusion at the end of Orwell’s *Animal Farm* really does exist in the NSW Parliament


- c. Reduce the network's passenger capacity while falsely claiming it will provide a 60% increase – the numbers were provided by a private operator, indeed a contractor with a vested interest, which distorted the comparison between double-decked trains and metros by about 95%. That canard was repeated by Infrastructure Australia which presumably did not check the numbers or understand Sydney despite the issues being ventilated by ABC Fact Checkers, Ron Christie (former Rail Coordinator General) and the ABC's Lateline, as well as being formally submitted to Ministers and governmental inquiries
- d. Forced the projects on communities through non-elected apparatchiks in statutory agencies which themselves have defective legislation.

Of course NSW will proceed regardless of Federal misgivings, as did Labor in NSW and Victoria, but that is no reason for iA to join competing fan clubs at risk of its reputation. Naturally COAG should do a complementary, not harmonised, role in order to achieve the best possible population growth, infrastructure improvement and economic and environmental outcomes. That is not being done now.

Political/ideological battles and suppression of logic over Metro trains, urban freeway “missing links”, the Parramatta to Epping line as part of Chatswood to Parramatta (with nary a squeak of protest even though all the ideologues are now claiming to be helping Parramatta) threaten Sydney's sustainability. Omitting Maldon-Dombarton shows a lack of knowledge of eastern seaboard logistics economics and engineering. iA's own placement of a tram from the CBD to Green Square as “among the nation's top infrastructure priorities... due to road congestion” without mentioning the two stations in the zone was a self-condemnation of iA: my case study will show the reasons for that judgement as with the other cases.

2. Governance is so wrong

Governance matters – see the Auckland Royal Commission. That not one official agency is addressing such frameworks is a sign of the poor approaches within Australian governments and lobbies. Indeed, the influence of lobbies is the main reason for the dysfunctionalities of governance and failure to achieve housing, congestion, sustainable financing, environmental and like outcome-based PIs (which are also absent, the Council on the Cost and Quality of Government's Report on these was not published). The lobby influences are even exercised through direct memberships and appointments which have been mapped. The solution to the “planning problem” is also a solution to governance failures as documented at length in the reports that will otherwise be posted on the Revitalise website, summarised in this copyright illustration:



There are long discussions of best-practice governance within Australian traditions and principles, with flow-charted solutions, and a reliance on the implementation of Treasury and iA methodologies *ab initio* and properly – not evaded as at present. Having done almost nothing to achieve its goals, iA endorsed the Metro without any credible review while the NSW Government was demolishing community inputs and regulatory systems – 180° “arse-about” as Greiner put it. That iA is part of that sad formula is astonishing.

Indeed, the precedent of a failed Premier being replaced will be posited as a possible outcome - in NSW and specifically Sydney there are major factors which disfigure democracy almost beyond recognition. The greatest travesties happen at the bookends – election lies and implementation deceits. Both heighten an instability between pro- and anti-development factions under the pressure of unlearning advocates of high-rise developments: the consistency of a normal project pipeline has been lost. A supposedly commercially astute government is making obvious market mistakes in its urban directions. The watchdogs of the past have gone – no universities, lobbies or professions have the wit or courage any longer to alert the community to such sad realities.

The Government has admitted it discards correspondence from professionals and the community over problems in the health portfolio, but the Blue Mountains' economic and tax crises, the lack of basis for council amalgamations, and even perceived corruption were treated similarly. Governmental and industry structures are silos within silos and break Lord Acton's dictum that “Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity”. Democracy is defeated by self-interested lobbyists/donors who cannot see the benefits of engaging communities in setting negotiated planning outcomes and expanding financing limits. To quote legendary head of the Premier's Department Gerry Gleeson's *Spann Oration*,

The proliferation of advisers can lead to tensions, arguments, differences of opinions and often resentments. Political advisers should be carefully chosen as they were in the early days of the Carr Government. However they are now often chosen for political reasons with inadequate qualifications and experience in the portfolio area. They have a privileged position, close to the ear of the Minister. They are the entry point for lobbyists.

Consult Australia produced *Capturing Value – realising new funding for infrastructure and urban renewal* in 2013, with the following principles (all currently absent) to be implemented:

1. Develop a comprehensive, long-term plan
2. Embrace genuine and robust stakeholder consultation*
3. Carefully select the improvement district
4. Create a shared vision
5. Establish a clear and balanced governance framework
6. Understand the risks and rewards for all stakeholders
7. Use incentives to attract private investment and better design
8. Secure the ability to influence outcomes
9. Build trust as a core value.

All this is admirable but reality is well behind theory.

* should be “engagement”

The urban budget, if achieved, would encompass Federal and State governmental sources (general subsidies and programs and *cf* the “tax incremental financing” method), private contributions from all sources including §94 covering local infrastructure, and profits from land-banking especially use of “brown fields” or recycling of army and utility properties, and so on. (State and LGA developer charges are dealt with together here as they suffer parallel defects.)

This is a next to impossible task in Sydney and is not covered by the Greater Sydney Commission Act.

The NSW Minister for Planning put the same perspective this way in his PhD thesis in 2007 (then experienced a “fall off the horse” on the road to Damascus under the tutelage of his surfing pal the Premier, with his own mis-statement of history here – wrong about communities not having influence before):

Public participation in NSW planning law is almost entirely controlled by the executive arm of state government and the officials who promote urban consolidation as the legitimate expression of the public interest. Enabling local councils to make their own LEPs [Local Environment Plans] would ... promote democratic, transparent and accountable policy making. **The progressive erosion of effective democratic institutions in planning by state governments is likely to increase the political potency of planning as an election issue at a state government level.** He says a new Sydney Planning Panel – to take the place of two joint regional planning panels – will shift more power to councils in approving developments. And he says the community will also be able to help shape significant plans for the city. It has never been possible before to be involved in the creation of district plans that have an impact on your local plans. There are some more avenues for participation than there were and there is the capacity in future for that participation to get greater over time as well. We are trying to go back to a more inclusive way when people thought about 'where do we have new suburbs, and how do we join them with walkways or bike paths or whatever it might be'. Using meaningless participation as a facade to cover over disagreement merely clogs up conflict, creating a dam of resentment, which spills over in the form of increasing litigation, loss of trust in politicians and administrators, and poor planning outcomes (SMH 9 Nov 2015).

On the basis of this page, one would expect the Minister to applaud the current approach to iA.

The Greater Sydney Commission’s legislation has drafting errors, negates community representation, ignores the lessons of history (especially the real, not incorrectly supposed, causes of failure of the Cumberland County Council), and worst of all, prohibits it from considering projects not in the Government’s grab-bag – so the community is disenfranchised (as by UrbanGrowth) and GSC is bound to fail. This adds to the confusion, misinformation and failed delivery of integrated planning and local government reforms from 2012. In NSW, and Victoria from 1994, amalgamations have increased the distance from people to councillors and even eliminated a local franchise such as in East Gippsland. That a new planning act with better features than his intentions and the various disasters left from 2012 is already available has not occurred to the Minister for Planning, it seems; while local government is continuing on its 19th Century way, unreformed and unrepentant.

The Newcastle inner rail controversy raged so long because a succession of “planning review committees” were comprised mostly of property interests with silo values dominating economic, land use, community and demographic interests. It was a microcosm of NSW in Dr Bowditch’s terms.

Since the crisis of 2009 when COAG tried to intervene on behalf of all other States and Territories, there has been no continuous improvement, instead the “fiasco” has become a “crisis”. This meets Einstein’s definition of stupidity.

There are three other matters of political/personal sensitivity which I cannot reveal at this stage.

3. The Solution Set

Democracy is broken, it must be fixed lest our descendants hold US in contempt (instead of this Cabinet). We have the exemplar in our own recent history. Bubonic plague broke out in January 1900. Panic ensued. Blame was sprayed from every corner of the New South Wales polity. Typhoid fever, consumption and gastrointestinal infections were an everyday reality for many families, with more than 1 in 9 infants dying each year. The dreaded smallpox was on the horizon again. But the Black Death was a death knell.

A difficult peace that was being developed between the State Government and the City Council fractured. At the December 1900 elections such citizen-reformers as Dr James Graham, Thomas Hughes, Jack Fitzgerald and John Garlick took the helm of the Council. They inherited a Council of low repute but asked to be judged by their own efforts, not their predecessors’. They worked with the Health professionals and sometimes against Chief Secretary’s, Treasury and the Harbour Commissioners, to achieve results. The Council wrote many Bills which were put to the Government: some were passed, some were ignored, some were modified. The Council negotiated major financial, operational and engineering schemes which reversed the public health risk. They initiated a planning Royal Commission which served as an international exemplar.

They were also pushed and prodded by the State Government which was often defensive over their agencies' failures. "They" - one reformist Alderman (Jack Fitzgerald) and one architect (John Sulman) - set up Australia's town planning movement.

The bigger "They" – the Council and its allies - drove many of their reforms through, changed the political environment, and earned respect through their determination and evident sense of fairness. That generation turned Sydney on its head, to the point where Sydney had a "planning consensus" (Spearritt) and came to lead the world in transport, urban redevelopment and some health policies. They learned from Europe and America but added their own nous and initiative. They complained about rotten boroughs and incompetent and disinterested municipal administrations, which with their contempt for State Government pushed them towards Greater Sydney.

Sydney 120 years later has a crisis manufactured by business leaders. They are in lock-step with conservative national and state governments to avoid accepted checks and balances in pursuit of their internal profit objectives, and to impose on families and small businesses a crippling load of debt and operational disturbance while they reduce risk and increase returns. The Tourism and Transport Forum has pushed metro trains unmercifully but admits it represents the 200 biggest operators – no, that is not democracy! The new "plague" is the Hong Kong metro model of suburban densification as decried by AECOM's Asia-Pacific head. A perpetuation of inter-generational ineptitude arising in the 2000s is proceeding apace. On a previous occasion a Liberal Premier was outed for planning incompetence, could it happen again?

It hardly seems to matter in this context that the names of the past leaders like Bradfield's have been besmirched by politicians who not understand history and who are trying to excuse their mistakes like children caught misbehaving. I hope you agree that we Australian and city citizens should care and force our three levels of representatives to act like responsible adults.

iA's stated roles include to

... publically advocate for reforms on key issues including financing, delivering and operating infrastructure and how to better plan and utilise Australia's infrastructure networks.

If iA is serious, it will adopt the Revitalise suite of reports in a process that meets the following required stages:

- Pay access fee and sign confidential deed
- Form project team
- Due diligence – maximum 1 month
- Schedule of agreed modifications to meet "green paper" standards (4 of)
- Pay full fee for Intellectual Property
- Brief COAG
- Proceed to proper community engagement

It is proposed that the PM speak to the NSW Premier to persuade him to co-operate in funding an RG series of Green Papers paper – this would have the added advantage of avoiding embarrassment associated with RG having to publish his critiques including of the Greater Sydney Commission. The Metro train and WestConnex projects have major problems not least of which are probity, governance, funding and systemic practicality. iA can revert to its proper status.

In absence of such agreement, iA would bear the full cost of IP and agree to critiques of the NSW Government.

Extensive correspondence and other documentation is available on all topics. I hope that there will be no delay in responding via telephone in the first instance and then formally. Considering all aspects, I must ask this happen within one week of today's date, i.e. by 10 a.m. on 22 August. I am not prepared to wait longer than that in the public and private interest.

Opportunities arising from Gibbons' work, to be transferred to an Implementation Unit (Fed/State as they decide):

NB Berejiklian spent \$180 m on ineffectual consultancies

OVER THE TOP OF ALL ELSE:

1. FEASIBILITY STUDY INTO REPLACEMENT FOR GOOGLE ICON BY UNLOCKING THE BAYS ETC (cf 5)
2. EDDINGTON BEDROCK: FROM CHRISTIE TO GREINER TO GIBBONS (LANDMARK RE-PLANNING OF SYDNEY)
3. CREATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF NSW LOCAL GOVERNMENT (CONSTITUTIONAL SIMPLIFICATION, GREINER TICK)

ISSUE	SOURCE OF CONCERN	IMPLICATIONS
1. iA failure to meet PM's non-bias, innovation and integrity promises re methodology, data collection and evidentiary failures – to reduce urban waste and re-balance population & employment budgets and programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • iA + Birrell + iA Board • Fed Cities and GSC parallel “Three Cities” and “30- Minute Cities” • PM (including tram, metro and WestConnex comments and allocations) • Board members in/on PIA and similar lobby structures 	<p>iA letter re “Rescue Sydney” - nil response. Ditto Resolving (Profound ignorance of Value Capture.)</p> <p>Inconsistency between GSC/Fed hopes and GSC/Fed endorsed projects, exhaustion of budgets and critical increases in congestion and housing costs</p> <p>Ditto repeated advice of errors on metros, WestConnex (PM agreed, Grattan) and Waterloo</p>
2. Thinking Logical Logistics II: Eastern Seaboard Freight Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Albanese • Truss • NTC / ALC 	<p>Errors in iA and iNSW freight plans persist with Chinese distortion, HST confusions and logistics pipeline in disarray, misuse Value Capture, better option via Greiner SIS/Main West</p>
3. Creative Reconstruction of NSW Local Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BOF & Page/Hazzard • Baird/Berejiklian • Stokes • GSC Chief Commissioner 	<p>Solves 100 years of LG probs + better basis for GSC structure & engagement + Greiner agreed with 2 critical elements – better options re NIMBY and amalgamations. Massive breakthrough</p>
4. ReviveBlueMountains	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baird • NSW Business Chamber • PM & Colbeck • Ferguson/Giuseppe 	<p>Only application of UK's BV 360° methodology in Australia, also reduce fire risk and housing unaffordability. Corrupt industry killed local action, Baird imposed \$190 m unjustified rates on families and SMEs.</p> <p>Template for BMs and other Tourism Regions suffered from govt non-support</p>
5. The Bays ICON post-Google + Goanna Transit Bridge + The Fireworks + unlock 16,000 housing units +two tram/train expressnets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baird/Berijiklian • Hartigan 	<p>Landmark CBD / innerwest innovation – quality of Lord Rogers' work. Google knew but Berejiklian was in her psycho-cheerleader mode re West Metro catastrophe and they left. \$500 million best value in Australia!</p>
6. Bondi Expressnet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PM 	<p>Urban innovation based on EC precedent</p>
7. Redfern/Broadway ExpressNet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PM 	<p>Urban innovation based on EC precedent</p>
8. Peninsula BRT f/up DOTARS 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baird / Berejiklian 	<p>State is incapable of neutral decision-making, reflective of Grattan recommendations which should be broadcast over the NSW heads. Community cynicism justified, Baird won't work (already adverse geo-tech)</p>
9. Innerwest tram loop completed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operator • Baird/Berejiklian 	<p>F/u Brian Howe BBC re Metro Light Rail. Same intent as (8)</p>
10. East Gippsland, Marysville and BMs socio-economic crises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chester • LGAs 	<p>Communities are in pain, economic innovation mapped and loved by mainstreet but rejected by inept LGAs. Defeat of Jobs & Growth</p>
11. Kudos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PM • GSC 	<p>Malcolm and Lucy are opinion leaders and we are on parallel paths, in most things, but I'm further down the track in design, implementation and engagement. Their errors need to be corrected sotto voce</p>